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24 APRIL 1987

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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UNTANGLING WEB OF CONFUSION OVER NAMES OF ISLAMIC GROUPS

Grenoble GRAND MAGHREB in French 10 Nov 86 pp 449-452

[Article by Francois Burgat]

[Text] Fundamentalism, religious radicalism (integristism), traditionalism, religious activism, Khomeynism, and the Muslim Brotherhood--are terms found as often in the press as, more significantly, they are used by specialists. These terms have been translated in variously way to designate what is now called more and more frequently "Islamisme" [Islamism].

At the roots of this difficulty in terminology is a very clear difficulty in understanding the phenomenon in all of its specific and varied characteristics.

As they particularly wished to settle on a single term to describe rather dissimilar activities, the best known observers of Islam "in action" at times, it is true, have unnecessarily complicated this problem of terminology.

There is nothing new about attitudes, conduct, statements, religion, and politics providing each other with mutual support, either in Islamic countries or elsewhere. These are so many phenomena which initial studies often combined a little hastily. Even though in the social sciences more than in other areas of knowledge we know how fragile are the origins of terms and the relativity of distinctions between them, these can now be more or less completely dissociated from "Islamism," that final product of the growth of political and religious life in Muslim countries. In a period of less than 10 years, from Olivier Carre¹ to Jean-Francois Clement², including Al Baki Hermassi³, Bruno Etienne⁴, Michel Camau⁵, Olivier Roy⁶, and many others, a usefuleffort has been made to clarify the terminologyused to describe this omnipresent "return of Islam." The elements of a relative consensus are emerging. Although the concept of "Islamism" is slowly becoming the standard term to refer to all of these phenomena, as it has become more specific it has no longer had the purpose of taking into account the totality of social attitudes or political behavior connected with or influenced by the Muslim religion. However, this distinction is never absolute. To one degree or another, the phenomenon is still associated with those terms which, inthe absence of defining them as a whole, bring out one or another of its dimensions, one or another of its relationships. Simultaneously with this effort made by those "outside" of Islam to rationalize these terms has

occurred an identical process within the Islamist movement. Often, these efforts collide with each other, if only as a result of the rejection by Islamists of certain of the terms associated with them. It is the tangled maze of these numerous terms (all of them wrong, although only partially so) which we wish to attempt to separate, by following along the moving borderlines of Islamic obscurity.

Islam and Islamism

It is possible to be a Muslim, or a member of the "Islamic" community, without being an Islamist. Although this is quite evident, this initial distinction is nevertheless frequently unknown.

However, this distinction has made it possible, as Michel Camau⁷ has written, "to avoid in any way confusing a political and religious phenomenon, which is temporary in character, and a culture more than 1000 years old. For example, the statement that 'Tunisian society is Islamic' describes one of its dimensions which the events of the past decade cannot challenge or diminish. On the other hand, this short term can refer to the way in which Islam is perceived, represented, and mobilized within a society. It is from this point of view that we can speak of the 'Islamist' impact."

Bruno Etienne and Mohamed Tozy favor using this term, "Islamists." However, they also use it as a term of distinction which can be employed to distinguish Islamists from "the conventional Muslim," as well as the active supporters of certain mystical practices, such as the Sufis. They also emphasize that the term Islamist is also the one most often used by the parties concerned themselves.

Souhayr Belhassen noted that the term "Islamist" is "often used by women wearing the 'Hijab'" (veil). In any case this term is preferred to that of "Muslim, which is unsatisfactory."⁸ Certainly, the term which they have chosen to identify themselves (Al Islamiyyoune) [Islamiyun] does not define any more clearly an "Islamist woman" than the other of its two possible translations, "an Islamic woman." However, it is the former translation, "Islamist woman," which French speaking militants are using more and more frequently. And, above all, the important thing is to note the claim to a specific identity which the "Islamiyyine" [Islamiyun] (Islamists) use to refer to the rest of the "Muslimin" (Muslims).

However, as in the case of all distinctions, what distinguishes Islamists and its Islamic militants from the community of believers is not an absolute. This culture, which is more than 1000 years old, cannot be limited to the interpretation which one group temporarily employs or to the political use to which such a group would like to subject it. The capacity of such a group to play a growing role in the Muslim community as a whole, which may go so far as to exercise moral and political leadership, may of course lead to making this distinction a relative one, over a period of time.

Islamic Fundamentalism, Mysticism, and Religious Mysticism

Within the strictly religious sphere certain kinds of ceremonies, certain forms of religious practice, or certain schools of thought at times presented

as "traditional" and which imply on the part of their supporters or adherents an excess of religious activity, whether involving efforts to expand the Islamic faith or not, are often incorrectly related to the Islamist tendency, at least by less discriminating observers. These include Sufi mysticism and the activities of marabout preachers. However, there is a great distance between some recognition of modernity on their part and an explicit determination to play a political role. We will see this in the attitudes and practices which characterize the Islamist tendency.

The theoreticians of Islamism are by no means the last to make this distinction. They often prefer to say that "traditional" Islam is "archaic" and is a brake on the development of their thinking and its manifestations and a kind of obstacle to their activities.

Rached Ghannouchi, leader and theoretician of the Islamic Tendency Movement in Tunisia, has said: "(The Islamist message) has encountered obstacles within Islam due to the traditionalist image of Islam which they have inherited. I mean by that spiritualist teachings, the forms of religious practice introduced rather recently in history and which have no relationship with Islam: Sufism, the Dervish movement, visits to the tombs of one's ancestors, "hadrah" or "meetings" held by the Sufis, the veneration of the saints, etc."⁹.

However, here as elsewhere the dividing lines between these practices are not hermetically sealed. The mobilization of religious activists of the traditional kind has some relationship to Islamism. We have only to recall the role of the Sufi brotherhoods in the resistance to colonialism¹⁰ to make an initial connection. More recently, the "Jama'at-al-Tabligh" association, which originated in Pakistan and which has left its mark in the Maghreb over the past few decades, has called on Muslim believers to practice their faith more intensively. It has often been mentioned by the Islamists themselves as an introductory phase to their own efforts. After having learned the limits of strictly religious activism, many members of the "Jama'at-al-Tabligh" have looked for a more effective extension of their efforts in political activity, thus crossing the border into "Islamist" activity, properly speaking.¹¹

Islamism and Traditionalism

In Islamic countries, as elsewhere, there have always been political statements linked more directly than others to Muslim tradition. However, not all of them have had much direct connection with Islam and, even less, with Islamism. In this way it has been at least possible to distinguish them from Muslim "traditionalist" behavior and, most often, clearly to dissociate the two.

Olivier Roy commented ironically: "The desire to mold society in the recollection which one has of the society of one's father or grandfather"¹² has served everywhere and throughout history as a point of reference for certain fringe groups in human societies. He continued: "Everyone knows very well that, since schools have existed, there have been those who deplored the fact that the intellectual level of students has gone down."¹³ However, it was not on the basis of the crude development of this kind of outmoded and conservative attitude that the sudden explosion of "Islamism" was nourished.

As distinguished from Islamism, Islamic traditionalism "in fact has no political program" and is directed simply "toward everything which is conservative. Moreover, its nostalgia for the past is more moralistic in tone than moved by a desire for social justice,"¹² whereas this theme is one of the favorites in Islamist statements.

The favored relationship of traditionalism with religion is based on the fact that "the issues naturally turn toward customs: veils for women, the education of girls, filial piety, and respect for the natural hierarchy of things,"¹² all of which are values close to the standard sphere of religion.

Traditionalist practices are found more naturally in the countryside than in the city, among social groups not much affected by Western culture rather than among those groups which have begun to discover it, among groups with little access to schools (or only to religious schools) rather than in faculties of science, among middle aged people rather than among the young. As we see, we are far from the social or political points of view of the Islamists. The prominent personage in the countryside on close terms with the religious establishment, unfamiliar with Western culture (whose technology he rejects automatically), should not be confused with the young student of science who is capable of "internal" criticism of Western values which are at least familiar to him and from which he knows very well how to take certain portions. The "traditionalist" will reject television, which is suspected of bringing a devastating form of modernity into his life. The Islamist would like to increase the number of TV sets, after having assured himself of control over the broadcasts.¹³

When political speeches are mixed in with this, it has often added to the confusion. To "disqualify" political speeches, it has often been found necessary, whether it was done deliberately or not, to "eliminate" them. The initial Islamist statements of their programs were systematically associated by the media (in the Maghreb and in the West) with "outmoded" reactions of the past, which they really were not.

In 1975, when Hind Chelbi, a young student of theology, inflicted on the "supreme combatant" the insult of contradicting him before the cameras of domestic television and, draped in his "traditional" garb (in fact, he was completely uninvolved with local traditions), he refused to accept the fatherly embrace of the old leader, politicians made a basic misinterpretation of the episode. In what would be considered now one of the first exhibitions before the media of the Islamist tendency, local politicians then only saw in it the remnants of a kind of traditionalism "destined to disappear before the most recent advances of modernity." The error was not only one of terminology.

Islamism and Fundamentalism

Contrary to traditionalism, Islamic fundamentalism broadly shares in the concepts and activities of the Islamists, for which it is the doctrinal basis.

"Fundamentalism" is the idea that it is necessary to make "an absolute return to the Muslim scriptures as the only foundation of any criticism or of any

change."¹⁴ No doubt, by the very force of things this involves a return to the past, and this often to an incorrect comparison to traditionalism. However, this return is only justified as long as it brings Muslims back to the "original purity" of the faith. Olivier Roy says: "The enemy is not modernity, but rather tradition. Therefore, this is a kind of reformism."¹² Contrary to traditionalism, fundamentalism, moreover, produces rather more militants than merely passive followers. As the spokesman of a program for change which is much less watered down than that proposed by conservatism, pure and simple, fundamentalism can even be revolutionary. Although the cause for this return to the Koran may be understood, in effect it still remains to be determined with precision what this return should seek.

Thus, the objectives sought vary as a function of the personality of the originators of the proposal (and therefore the results of their interpretation of the Koran. While they deny it, they most often arrogate to themselves a monopoly over the interpretation of the Koran). However, the objectives also vary as a function of the cultural context and the local political situation. Thus, the fundamentalism of Colonel Qadhdhafi is particularly radical because it sweeps away the whole tradition (Sunnah) of Muhammad (considered both unreliable and perverted by its professional interpreters). This is done in favor of reliance on the Koran alone. This has logically attracted the opposition of conservative elements or those which are simply "orthodox" and who denounce this outlook as pure apostasy. On the other hand, the vigorous preaching of the verses of the Koran regarding women has brought even Qadhdhafi the sympathy of the most modernist urban circles which are reluctant to see the Koranic message applied literally in a sense which they consider alien to its true meaning.

Olivier Roy tells us that a society like that in Afghanistan is largely regulated by the provisions of Muslim law. On this most rural fringe of Arab society, Islamic fundamentalism preaches a conventional "return" to the traditions of the prophet. On the other hand, this does not mark any significant break with the past. By supporting the practices in force this kind of fundamentalism even comes close to traditionalism. On the other hand, in more Westernized, urban circles, that is, in most Arab cities, the same message, expressing defiance of the nationalist elites who have adopted modernization, almost automatically will carry with it "a connotation of challenge," bringing it close to Islamism.¹²

However, the line which separates fundamentalism and Islamism is clear. Although from some points of view the Islamists are all fundamentalists, that is, are all supporters of a return to the text of the Koran and to the Sunnah of the prophet in order to draw from them the moral, social, and political teachings necessary for the rebirth of the Muslim religion, not all of them follow the same approach in this effort. In this sense, the fundamentalists are not Islamists.

While they agree on their ends, which they describe in almost identical ways, in effect they differ on means. While it is suspect in the fundamentalist movement, modern technology is explicitly accepted by Islamists. However, even clearer is the difference between the two groups on the question of the state and of politics, territory, and the instruments of action, which fundamentalist thought and action in the strict sense ignores. On the other

hand, these are at the center of Islamist views. In effect, fundamentalist activity is limited to the moral sphere and does not take political activity into account (that is, achieving power), nor does it consider the economic sphere as suitable for expending its resources or for undertaking activities in connection with it. That is the whole difference with the Islamist view of things, whose "hard core" lies in this movement into politics, this decision to take over the government "from above," this recognition of the state as an essential place for carrying out a civilizing program which elsewhere it largely shares with fundamentalist doctrine.

The idea of fundamentalism mentioned elsewhere in this article and, finally, the "Salafi" movement of the end of the 19th century and, as such, its connotation varies among the Islamists with the perception which those involved have of the reformist tendency. The principal spokesmen for these perceptions were al-Afghani (1837-1897); Muhammad 'Abduh (1849-1905), founder of AL-MANAR, a Cairo publication; or Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who "turned the movement and his publication toward more doctrinal rigidity."¹⁶

The Salafis are most often assigned responsibility for having made criminal concessions to the West. Rached Ghannouchi wrote: "In the first few years of our relations with the West the duty of a Muslim thinker was to prove by all available means that Islam was in conformity with modern civilization. For example, Muhammad 'Abduh, as Hourani said, 'Conceded to Europe its claim of having discovered the laws of progress and of social welfare and went so far as to say that these laws are in conformity with Islam.' The duty of Muslim thinkers and political figures was then to turn the Islamic world toward the path of the West, to follow in the steps of the advanced nations, according to the established view among us." (See "L'Occident et nous" [The Occident and Us], Maqallat, Dar el Karouane, Paris, 1984.) On the contrary, at times the reformers at the beginning of the 20th century were responsible for the fact that this overvaluation of the golden age had the effect of hardening our intellectual arteries in terms of the development of Islamist thought. When it is read from the point of view of the Tunisian "progressive Islamists," it appears to be marked by the stigmata of a rigid conservatism which reportedly feared to confront the demands of the world with the idealized representations of the first centuries of the hegira.¹⁷

At times unrecognized by outside observers, the difference seems to make more and more sense among those actively involved. Although Salafi's (fundamentalists) and "Ikhwanists" (literally, "members of the brotherhood," a reference to the Muslim Brotherhood) agree on fundamental aspects of their objectives and very broadly in terms of how to express them, they differ on the selection of the means which they will use and on the priority assigned to the various things they do. In mentioning the difference which he sees between an "alim" (the singular form of "ulama," a religious scholar, here seen in the role of a fundamentalist) and an Islamist, Abdessalam Yassine, one of the principal founders of the Moroccan Islamist movement, explains the limits of fundamentalist action in this way:¹⁵ "What the few ulamas are doing is very interesting, but it isn't enough. (No doubt) they are part of the opposition (but this is) an opposition in principle, which goes on forever. They only point their fingers at things which they consider immoral. This kind of effort is not enough because you have to go on to the next stage, which involves having a specific 'proposal.' These ulamas only denounce moral

matters. With only a few exceptions they never speak of economic problems and rarely of political affairs, whereas the essential thing is to come to the realization that there is a very close relationship between immorality and the economic and political system. We seek power. This is permitted under a democratic system. This is what we want."

Let us add that in the past fundamentalist doctrine and strategy were able to identify themselves in part at least with those of the ulamas of official, institutionalized Islam. The refusal to move on into political activity then produced in some of them a certain prudence regarding colonialism. Some representatives of the religious establishment feel up to the present that colonialism has some credibility.

Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood

Writing about Tunisia,¹⁸ Michel Camau said: "The Islamist thrust is often perceived as the work of the 'Muslim Brotherhood,' whose members are called 'Khouangi' by the man in the street. This practice is far too simplistic. It tends to present the image of a strongly structured organization, whereas we find, rather than one party or one sect, a movement of ideas taking multiple forms. Furthermore, by combining these multi-formed elements all Islamists are assumed to have the most sectarian or the most radical positions."

Comparing Islamism merely to the Muslim Brotherhood (as frequently done by Arab public opinion and by the West) is unquestionably wrong. However, when we recall the origins of Islamism, this leads, at least in some respects, to reducing the extent of the error.

Above all, the term "Muslim Brotherhood" takes us back, in effect, to an historically dated and territorially limited phenomenon: the very hierarchical organization established by Iman Hasan ibn-Ahmad ibn-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna in the Egypt of the end of the 1920's. Decimated by 'Abd-al-Nasir, at first tolerated and then again prohibited by his successor, the "assistant," "affiliated," or "active" brothers, according to the hierarchy established by Al-Banna,¹⁹ the "Ikhwan al-Muslimin," in the course of a few decades, nevertheless constituted a political force of the first order, exercising an influence throughout the entire Arab world proportional to that of "Mother Egypt," whose place in the Arab intellectual field of the time does not require reiteration at this point. The fact that the description originated by Al-Banna ("We are brothers in the service of Islam. Therefore, we are Muslim brothers")²⁰ acquired significance because of its generic name therefore well emphasizes the innovative character of the "brothers," who had no real precedent or central or even monopolistic position of the kind which they had in the establishment of the Islamist tendency. Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and their successors exerted such doctrinal domination for a long time in the Maghreb that it is not astonishing that their disciples have been able to keep the name of the founding fathers until this day. The relationship is unquestionable, attested to, if it were needed, by the very mouths of their Maghrebian descendants.¹¹ The Muslim Brotherhood, organized as a political party and explicitly assuming its temporal role (its members are the first to wish to assume government power.), are well and truly the first Islamists. It was only the later evolution of these movements, particularly in the Maghreb, which would see internal diversification take

place, on the one hand, and a partial, doctrinal "process of autonomy" occur, on the other hand, both of which now justify the fact that confusion in terminology is no longer in question. Neither in the organizational, tactical, or doctrinal field does the Muslim Brotherhood any longer represent the totality or even, perhaps, the majority of its existing factions. The position and degree of autonomy with regard to the Egyptian founding fathers have even become, as we will see, the criteria for distinguishing the Maghrebian movements among themselves.

Nevertheless, these relationships remain no less important and must be taken into account to gain a complete understanding of Islamism today.

Islamism and Khomeynism

Although not fully adapted to Islamism, Khomeynism rather largely shares its basic shape.

Perhaps Khomeynism is, above all, Islamism "which has succeeded." As the Libya of Qadhdhafi, following the Egypt of 'Abd-al-Nasir, was to Arabism, Iran under Khomeyni was the first country (with the exception of Pakistan) to have converted an Islamist objective into state practice, which, until then, was limited to confidential statements by opposition groups.

This doctrine was fertile enough to collect the fruits of an outstanding and unquestioned political victory over a regime which had been represented as one of the most powerful in the world and which had provided itself with new resources for acting simultaneously in civil society and on the international scene.

However, at the height of its victory, Khomeynism did not in any way generate, as is sometimes still said, the Islamist tendency, which by definition is polycentric, just as the Imam of Qom should not now be considered the leader of an Islamist orchestra which would respond to any of his requests. On the other hand, Khomeynism and its theoretician have held and still hold now an unquestionable attraction for all of the Islamist movements. Some of them even receive, to all appearances, more than moral support. However, the best present by Khomeyni to the Islamist cause was his own political victory over the shah. In 1979 this victory brought a highly valued contribution to movements which were still in gestation. The credibility and social solidity of these movements is still felt at this time.

However, the natural recognition of Iran has its limits. They proceed directly from limitations on the adaptability of Khomeynist doctrine and strategy to the Arab context in general and the Maghrebian situation in particular.

The borderline of this difference involves first of all the specific aspects of the country where Khomeynism was developed, that is, in relation to Shi'ism. The origins of the religion of the supporters of Ali (compared to the Sunni movement, which has a large majority in the Maghreb) owes as much, as we know, to the existence of a substantial clergy as it does to the tradition of challenging temporal power, nourished by the theory of a hidden imam and whose equivalent is not found among the Sunni.

However, the differences do not stop there. As the first product of Islamist statements, the Iranian regime and, with it, the doctrines of its imam, were also the first to suffer the effects of the very widespread process of being worn down by holding power. Confronted with the demands of government activity, Khomeyni statements have lost their mythical function in which a large part of their power to mobilize the people lay. And it has made choices which have not received unconditional, or at least explicit approval from all parts of Islamist "society," particularly in the Maghreb. The Islamic Liberation Party,²¹ which supports the return to the Caliphate abolished by KemalAtaturk in 1924, reportedly has broken relations with Iran after having seen its draft of an Islamic constitution rejected in favor of a draft considered too conventional for its taste.

Although on an overall basis support for Iran remains the rule, some groups, when explaining this or that aspect of Khomeyni activity, have not failed to emphasize the "specific" character of Shi'ite Islam. However, in the name of the unity of Islam, the same authors are reluctant to express this point, in other circumstances.

Islamism and Religious Radicalism (Integrism)

While noting that, among all of the terms in use, that of "religious radicalism (integrism)" seems to have imposed itself very broadly in the media, how can we fail to remark that, with the exception of some forms of "fanaticism," it is the only term which has so frankly negative a connotation, in the sense of the concern which, rightly or wrongly, this movement has aroused in Western public opinion. It is particularly for this reason that this term has been rejected by the Islamists themselves (doing the opposite would have been surprising). This term has been treated in much the same way by foreign observers, journalists, or researchers, to the extent that their reservations have led them little by little²² to using more precision in what they write. This has happened less often, moreover, as has often been written, because it was initially believed that taking account of a phenomenon internal to the Christian religion would give it a precise meaning because of its origins. This would make it impossible to use it to describe the Islamist tendency in its present state of diversity and even less in terms of its essence.

Initially, the term religious radicalism (integrism) was created to take into account not so much a problem of interpreting doctrine but rather a question of practice. That is, "the rejection of the adaptations resulting from the actions of the church and of believers on liturgical, pastoral, and social matters."²³ However, the term has had a second life since then, under a noticeably different flag. More and more it serves to designate those fundamentalists whose reading of the sacred scriptures is the most unbending, the most literal, and the most rigid. As such this tendency is the most reticent about accepting new forms of religious exegesis which constitute Muslim "Ijtihad" (an effort at interpretation). Hence, the term takes its place in a useful way in the terminological dictionary. There are radical Islamists. However, the term should not be raised to the status of a generic expression. Not particularly because it did not originate with Islam (because we have trouble in seeing why this transposition, so frequent in the

development of the vocabulary of the social sciences, would be enough to discredit it) but because it only reflects one of the tendencies of the Islamist movement and, moreover, is tending to become a minority faction.

FOOTNOTES

1. One of the uncontested masters in reflections on political Islam, as reflected in several works he has written or edited, particularly: "Les freres musulmans (en collaboration avec Thierry Michaud)" [The Muslim Brotherhood (in collaboration with Thierry Michaud)], Gallimard/Julliard, Collection of Archives, 1983; "Islam et Etat" [Islam and the State], P. U. F., 1982; "Mystique et politique" [Mysticism and Politics], FNSP/Cerf, 1984; "Radicalismes islamiques" [Islamic Radicalism] (collection of essays edited by P. Dumont), L'Harmattan, 1986, 2 volumes, etc.
2. See in particular "Journalistes et chercheurs des sciences sociales face aux mouvements islamistes" [Journalists and Social Science Researchers on the Islamist Movements], Archives de sciences sociales des religions, January-March 1983, pp 85-101, and "Pour une comprehension des mouvements islamistes" [For a Better Understanding of Islamist Movements], in ESPRIT, January 1980, pp 38-50.
3. "La societe tunisienne au miroir islamiste" [Tunisian Society in the Islamist Mirror], MAGHREB-MACHREQ, MONDE ARABE (No 103), January-March 1984, p 39.
4. "La vague islamiste au Maghreb" [The Islamist Wave in the Maghreb], in POUVOIRS (No. 12), 1983, and--in collaboration with Mohamed Tozy, "La da'wa au Maroc, prolegomenes theorico-historiques" [Arraignments in Morocco, Preliminary Theoretical and Historical Observations], in "Radicalismes islamiques" edited by O. Carre, op. cit., vol. 2, pp 5-32.
5. "Chroniques politiques, Tunisie" [Political Chronicles, Tunisia] in "Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord" [North Africa Yearbook], CNRS, Paris 1981 et seq.
6. "L'Afghanistan, Islam et modernite politique" [Afghanistan, Islam, and Political Modernity], Seuil (Collection Esprit), Paris, 1985. The work by Olivier Roy, to which this present article owes a great deal, furthermore provides a valuable complementary analysis on the origins of the Islamist phenomenon, thanks to a comparative study. The concept which he advances results from observation of a society, Afghanistan, which is different in a dual sense from Maghrebian societies. It is non-Arab, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, is one of the few Muslim societies to have escaped direct Western colonization. To some extent Olivier Roy confirms the special relationship of the phenomenon with the cultural effects of Western domination. The only common point in Arab and Afghan history is precisely this kind of acculturation, from which, despite the preservation of its political independence, Afghanistan did not escape in any way.
7. Regarding the "Poussee Islamiste en Tunisie" [Islamist Drive in Tunisia],

- see the "Chronique politique Tunisie" in the "Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, 1979" CNRS, Paris, 1981.
8. "Femmes tunisiennes islamistes" [Islamist Tunisian Women] in "Le Maghreb Musulman en 1979" [The Muslim Maghreb in 1979], edited by C. Souriau, CNRS, Paris, 1981, p 77.
 9. Interview with C. Souriau, in "Le Maghreb Musulman en 1979," op cit, p 379.
 10. See Jean-Claude Vatin, "Islamic Resistance and State Power in Algeria" in "Islam and Power," Ali Dessouki, New York, 1981.
 11. See F. Burgat, "Aux sources de l'islamisme en Tunisie" [The Sources of Islamism in Tunisia], interview with Ahmida Enneifer, editor of 15/21, in GRAND MAGHREB (No. 44), further developed in "Les intellectuels et le pouvoir: Syrie-Egypte, Tunisie, Algerie" [Intellectuals and Power: Syria and Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria], contained in DOSSIERS DU CEDEJ (courtesy of the Embassy of France), Cairo, 1986, pp 211-222.
 12. Olivier Roy, "L'Afghanistan: Islam et modernite politique," op cit.
 13. Olivier Roy, "L'Islamisme" [Islamism], presentation at the Training Seminar for Teachers of History and Geography of the Rectorate of Aix-en-Provence, Marseille, La Baume-les-Aix, 23 April 1986.
 14. Olivier Carre, "Mystique et politique," op cit, p 35.
 15. From an interview with Mohamed Tozy in D. E. A., "Croisement du champ politique et du champ religieux au Maroc" [Crossroads of the Political and Religious Fields in Morocco], Aix-en-Provence, 1982, see p 124.
 16. L. Gardet, "L'Islam" [Islam], Editions D. D. B., p 320.
 17. See F. Burgat, "Islamismes en Tunisie" [Islamist Movements in Tunisia], in GRAND MAGHREB (No 44), November 1985.
 18. "Chronique politique en Tunisie" [Political Chronicle in Tunisia] in "Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord," CNRS, Paris, 1981.
 19. See Olivier Carre, "Mystique et politique," op cit, p 8.
 20. Quoted by Olivier Carre and Gerard Michaud, "Les freres musulmans" [The Muslim Brotherhood], op cit, p 8.
 21. Established in 1952 in Jordan by Taqieddine Nabhani, the PLI [Islamic Liberation Party] now exists in most of the Arab countries and particularly in Tunisia, where its members, who are very active in the Tunisian Army, have recently been involved in several trials.
 22. Slowly. it is true. See F. Burgat, "Integristes: la voie tunisienne" [Religious Radicalists (Integrists): the Tunisian Way], in GRAND MAGHREB (No 34), October 1984.
 23. Olivier Carre, "Mystique et politique," op cit, p 35.

NDP SEEN INVOLVED IN ELECTION RIGGING, PRESSURE TACTICS

Attacks On Opposition

Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 22 Mar 87 pp 1,4

[Article: "NDP Secretary General and Gizah Governor Embroiled In Serious Allegations"]

[Text] Secretary General of the National Democratic Party [NDP] and Agriculture Minister Dr Yusuf Wali has launched a vicious attack on the opposition parties. At the evening election conference he held the day before yesterday at the al-Wafa' wa al-Amal Club in al-Haram, he claimed that the opposition parties' chance at parliamentary representation was "virtually nil," and that even now the campaign had been decided in favor of the NDP! He also accused an opposition party leader of trying to appropriate a plot of land worth 50 million Egyptian pounds.

Gizah Governor Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan has determined that about 25,000 votes from the al-Haram district will go to the NDP in the coming elections, out of a total of 26,000 registered voters in that district. He said, in so many words, "We will leave 1,000 votes for all the opposition parties!"

The governor also urged executive and popular leaders in the governorate to collect as many ballots as possible right away, and to keep calling on all the election committees in order to influence their chairmen and bring the elections to a close at 1000 on 6 April (the governor of Gizah has emphasized that he does not recognize 13 April as the date for the re-elections), because this would decide the governorate elections in favor of the ruling party candidates. Minister of Manpower and Training 'Asim 'Abd-al-Haqq questioned the opposition press about its insults and disgusting abuse, which are punishable by law, and claimed that he attended the conference to announce the Egyptian workers' allegiance to the NDP and its president!

AL-WAFD has learned from informed sources that President of Gizah Governorate's local People's Assembly 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Abu-Humaylah is pressuring the independent candidates into conceding to NDP candidates in return for seats in the local assembly.

Plan To Rig Elections

Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 24 Mar 87 p 1

[Article: "AL-WAFD Places Serious Proof of Plans To Rig the Elections Before President Husni Mubarak"]

[Text] AL-WAFD has obtained irrefutable proof of secret plans prepared by the NDP to rig the People's Assembly elections. NDP leaders in the governorates have received letters from the party secretariat in Cairo detailing the secret plans to rig the elections.

Letters with these plans were sent to NDP secretaries in the districts and subdistricts, cautioning them to inform only trusted NDP members about them. The plans, to be used on the morning of the People's Assembly elections, include nine main points. The official document obtained by AL-WAFD also stresses the need for NDP leaders to find out which candidates on the opposition and independent parties' lists are trying to obtain special proxies. The secret plan also stressed the need to secretly urge young NDP members and party leaders to obtain such proxies, so that they can play a major role within the election committees. The plan also stipulates that the NDP village bureaus should be responsible for arranging food, lodging if necessary, and all kinds of beverages (!) for election committee members. In case the village is full, they should not be left with anyone but members of the NDP! The second stage of the NDP's secret plan to rig the People's Assembly elections begins by advising party delegates, whether or not they are on election committees, to get hold of any remaining ballots and mark them for the NDP, with the approval of the election committee chairmen.

The plan also stresses the need to cause disturbances with opposition party delegates in case the NDP members fail to falsify the ballots. According to the plan, security forces will step in as soon as the disturbances break out and "do whatever is necessary according to their instructions." AL-WAFD has found out that according to the secret NDP plan, "NDP members should use every means of recruiting supporters and getting them well-prepared to immobilize opposition party delegates on election day."

The plan also involves assigning certain individuals to provoke opposition party delegates, and stipulates what kind of persons should be assigned to carry out this provocation.

8559

CSO: 4504/189

FINANCE PLAN FOR NEW PAPER REVEALED

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 5 Mar 87 p 1

[Text]

THE government will take a back-seat in the financing of Bahrain's planned new Arabic daily newspaper, Minister of Information Tariq Almoayed has revealed.

"The government would rather not be directly involved in the ownership as it really doesn't look good," he said.

However, facilities for a soft loan would be made available.

A publisher for the new daily has yet to be announced, but the Minister said there had been no shortage of volunteers.

A committee has been formed to study the launching of the new paper, which would be the second Arabic daily in Bahrain.

Mr Almoayed said a report submitted this week dealt with ideas on staffing, printing and financing the new newspaper.

He added that the main aim behind a second paper was to create jobs for young Bahraini journalists and open up competition in the market.

"There should be wider market for journalists, not just one employer, and we hope that the new competition will mean an improvement in the quality of our papers. This is not a criticism of present standards, but our policy is that we should not be limited to just one publisher," he said.

/13104

CSO: 4400/187

AMBASSADOR TO U.S. INTERVIEWED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 11 Feb 87 pp 12-13

[Interview with Nizar Hamdun, Iraqi ambassador to the U.S., by Hadizal al-Shirbini; date and place not given]

[Text] In its war problem with Iran, Iraq did not pin much hope on the fifth Islamic Summit Conference in Kuwait for a possible end to the raging war. This was due to the fact that Iran, the principal party in the perpetuation of this war, refused to attend the summit, thus making it difficult for the summit to achieve a quick and just solution. However, the importance of this meeting of Arab Islamic heads of state is that it affirmed the just stance of Iraq in its conflict with Iran. Furthermore, the summit place new pressure on the Iranian enemy through Islamic public opinion.

With these statements Nizar Hamdun, Iraq's ambassador to the U.S. began his exclusive interview with AKHIR SA'AH. He answered questions about U.S. attempts to restore the confidence of Middle East countries in general and Gulf states in particular; U.S. condemnation of the Iranian aggression against Iraq; and President Reagan's commitment to reinforce the security of the Gulf states following the scandal of the U.S. arms sale to Iran, which was a major factor in the latter's recent aggression. The ambassador also answered a question on whether the arms shipment would affect the military balance between Iran and Iraq and his reaction to statements made by Robert McFarlane, former national security adviser, that the U.S. may be able to mediate between Iraq and Iran after the departure of Khomeyni because his presence would make it difficult for the U.S. to play an acceptable role in this mediation. The mabassador also answered other important questions about the support of the Syrian and Libyan regimes for the iranain regime which adopts a stance identical to that of Israel.

Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Homdun began the interview by saying: "With respect to the latest Iranian aggression, the Iraqi forces are still able to push back the aggressors and they are in full control of the situation. The Iranian side has failed to achieve its goals. We cannot understand the significance of any single battle in this war unless we understand the general course of the war. Iran wanted to make some regional gains at the expense of Iraq. This can be seen in Iran's public statements. The Khomeyni regime

has announced previously that it was seeking to achieve regional gains. In our opinion, the Iranian side is eager to do this in order to consolidate the government and avert the possibility of any takeover by the opposition as well as to cover up the government's complete failure to implement the economic plan.

From the Iraqi point of view, the war is essentially a defensive war in that we want to protect our national security and stop the Iranian intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq. For this reason Iraq is doing its utmost to inflict the greatest possible damage on the Iranian aggressors. This goal has been achieved in a distinctive manner in the recent battles.

Of equal importance to Iraq is the protection of the sovereignty of its territories and the safety and security of its citizens. I believe that the recent battles will end in the Iranian troops pulling back to the borders with many casualties. Consequently, this failure will have an impact inside Iran and the Iranians will wake up to the realization that the hopes that were raised by the Iranian regime have been shattered and come to a painful end.

The Iranian regime promised the Iranian people to end the war and score victory before the end of the Iranian year in March. Its failure to achieve any of its aggressive aims during this period means that disaster will befall the Iranian regime and its relationship with the Iranian people. In my estimate, the recent attacks are considered the last phase in this war. Officially, the war may last for a few more years until an Iranian ruler emerges who realizes that peace is more in the interest of his country than war. However, the war, in its broader combat context and the massive human assaults, will decline drastically following the failure of this aggression.

U.S. Arms And The Prolongation Of War

[Question] Let's now turn to the latest U.S. stance and the revelation of the arms sale to Iran. Do you believe that those arms shipments encouraged Iran to mount its latest attacks against Iraq? Do you subscribe to the American opinion that the U.S. arms do not affect the military balance between Iran and Iraq?

[Answer] There is no doubt that U.S. dealing with Iran, either in direct arms shipments or by tasking other parties such as Israel to make the shipments, did indeed encourage the Iranian government to continue to escalate the war as demonstrated by the shelling of Iraqi cities and the intensification of Iranian attacks of the front's southern sector. In other words, there are two aspects to the problem and it is difficult to say which is more dangerous. The first concerns supplying Iran with arms and the second aspect concerns the political recognition of the Iranian regime and its regional role at the expense of its neighbors, i.e., the Arab states in the region and in particular the Arab Gulf area.

In my estimate the arms shipments supplied to Iran by the U.S. and Israel will not alter the strategic and military balance in this war because Iran is not only suffering a short supply of arms and spare parts but is also

experiencing a host of mismanagement problems as well as political problems which have had a negative impact on military thinking. This is in addition to problems caused by the conflict between the Iranian regular army and the revolutionary guard and the loss of popular support for the war in Iran. On the other hand, the Iraqi side, aside from its air and land superiority in the deployment of troops, boasts a high level of military training and extensive battlefield experience gained through this long, raging war. Contributing to this vantage point is a wise leadership that utilizes all available resources efficiently and with minimal damage or casualty. This is in addition to the Iraqi's perception of the justice of their cause in that they are defending their land and cities.

Therefore, we do not believe that U.S. arms to Iran will alter the military balance. Rather, as mentioned earlier, it will make Iran all the more stubborn and will add to its conviction that its regional and international game will lead to some success through blackmail and acts of intimidation and terrorism. Furthermore, the U.S. arms sale to Iran will lead to the prolongation of the war and subsequently to greater casualties in both countries.

The American Deal Is Unacceptable

[Question] In light of your contacts with the American Administration following the revelation of secret contacts between the U.S. and Iran and the sale of arms to Iran, how did you express the Iraqi position on that issue?

[Answer] The Iraqi stance was clearly expressed in a communique issued by the Iraqi government which considered this precedent unacceptable for it does not achieve the U.S. stated objective of curtailing the war and pressuring the government of Iran into responding to Iraq's repeated requests for peace.

Iraq did not express a view other than that contained in the communique. We believe that the U.S. understands well Iraq's unequivocal stance which has never been different from the announced objectives of Iraqi policy.

No Soviet Threat Exists

[Question] The American Administration has used several pretexts in rationalizing its dialogue with Iran. Foremost among those is that Iran is vulnerable to a Soviet threat, hence a dialogue with Iran is critical so that it does not fall to the Soviets.

[Answer] We do not believe that Iran is exposed to any real Soviet danger, at least at the present time. This is nothing but a rationale used by the U.S. Administration to define the nature of perils facing Iran from the American point of view.

From our point of view, the direct threats facing Iran are posed by the continuation of war which is destroying the Iranian regime from within,

Iran's economy and its infrastructure. Therefore, anyone who cares about the unity and independence of Iran must seriously consider measures to end this war because this is the sole guarantee of Iran's unity and stability. Stopping the war will not be achieved unless pressure is applied on the current regime which is the only party calling for the continuation of war and publicly advocating occupation of the territories of another country, namely Iraq which is a sovereign country recognized as such regionally and internationally.

U.S. Pressure On Iran Is Required

[Question] What is your comment on statements made by Robert McFarlane, former national security adviser, that the U.S. may be able to mediate between Iraq and Iran, following the departure of Khomeyni, to end the war peacefully, because with Khomeyni being there the American role as a mediator will not be acceptable?

[Answer] McFarlane's view is illusionary. To believe that the removal of Khomeyni from power will in itself alter Iran's stand on the war, on terrorism, on current regional and international efforts to bring about peace, is wishful thinking. War may come to an end with or without Khomeyni in power. True, he is more stubborn than others, but those surrounding him have very much been influenced by his thinking. They perceive his style as exemplary, and they are equally stubborn. The only way to end the war is to put pressure on Iran. I believe that if Khomeyni is removed from power applying more pressure on Iran will lead to a more moderate stand by that country.

Syrian And Libyan Stand

[Question] It is clear that the Syrian and Libyan regimes support the Iranian regime. When we analyze this position we find that the position hold by the two countries is identical to that of Israel. Has there been any contact between Iraq and either regime following the revelation of the nature of relationship between Iran and Israel? Has there been any noticeable change in the two countries's position?

[Answer] The Syrian and Libyan regimes are persistent in their support of Iran against Iraq. I believe that the Syrian and Libyan governments ran out of excuses a long time ago and their dealing with the Iranian regime could never be justified even prior to the publication of reports about the Iranian-Israeli cooperation. This is partly due to Iraq's legitimate and just stance and partly due to the nature of the Iranian regime which is hostile to everything that is Arab or national.

For this reason I do not believe that the revealed secrets about cooperation between Israel and Iran will induce Syria and Libya to modify their stance. Even now we are noticing that public opinion in the region, now that the nature of the Israeli-Iranian relationship has been exposed, has begun to view the Syrian and Libyan policies with increasing suspicion. Yet sensitivity in the two countries has long been lost and I don't think it will ever be restored.

Egypt And The Arabs

[Question] Do you believe that President Mubarak's attendance at the Islamic Summit in Kuwait will be followed by concrete steps by the Arab states toward the resumption of relations with Egypt, as some press reports have indicated?

[Answer] The close relationship between Egypt and the Arabs is a reality from the practical point of view and more so from the official point of view. We Arabs believe that the practical aspect is more important. The formal and official aspects are all subject to other requirements and considerations. With the exception of Syria and Libya, we do not believe that the other Arab countries, with Iraq in the forefront, object to the resumption of relations with Egypt. The Arab countries, including Iraq, hope for the resumption of relations with Egypt as soon as possible. However, the dubious stance of both Syria and Libya has always produced what is called a veto of the Arab decision. We all know that the Syrian regime is responsible for postponing the Arab Summit Conference, and both Syria and Libya are directly responsible for obstructing the process of returning Egypt to the Arab fold.

Egypt's Stance And Its Historical Role

[Question] What is your assessment of Egypt's stance on the Iran-Iraq war, the Palestinian question and other pressing Arab issues?

[Answer] The Egyptian stance on the Iran-Iraq war and the Palestinian issue has always been in tune with Egypt's historical role. For this reason I do not believe that there is anything unusual in this stance and I do not think that any Arab or Iraqi has been surprised by this stance since it is a logical stance in full harmony with what we know of Egypt.

[Question] Are there any new peaceful initiatives to end the Iran-Iraq war?

[Answer] Currently, there are no serious efforts due to the continued Iranian stubbornness and Iran's adamant rejection of peaceful efforts to end the conflict.

[Question] Do you believe that the Iran-Iraq war is affected by other Arab issues such as the Lebanese or Palestinian issues? Or are they unrelated.

[Answer] I believe that all conflicts in the Arab region are interrelated. The continuation of the Iran-Iraq war has a negative impact on the Palestinian question and joint efforts by the PLO and other parties to restore Palestinian rights. On the other hand, the complication of the situation in Lebanon and the continued shelling of Palestinian camps and the ineffectiveness of Arab-Palestinian initiatives all combine to have a negative impact on Arab concerted efforts to provide the required support to the Iraqi army and people in their struggle against the Iranian aggressors.

13257/7687

CSO: 4404/252

BRIEFS

NORTHERN OPPOSITION GROUPS ATTACKED--Fugitives from Iraq report that the fascist regime's tyranny and suppressive practices have been intensifying in recent weeks affecting the largest number of opponents to the regime and its policy which is designed to force a large portion of the population to leave the country. Reports indicate that government forces, backed by fighter planes and tanks, have attacked a number of villages in northern Iraq on a wide scale, threw hundreds of citizens in jail and executed a large number of citizens for their opposition to its acts of terrorism. The Iraqi security forces arrested about 300 intermediate and high school students in the town of Sulaymaniyah, of whom a large number were tortured to death. One year after their arrest, more than 100 of those students were executed late last month and their bodies were delivered to their relatives. Despite these suppressive acts, the Iraqi national resistance in more than one place continued its struggle against the fascist regime and units of resistance are actively engaged in operations to topple the traitor regime of Saddam. [Text] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 11 Feb 87 p 1] 13257/7687

CSO: 4404/252

DEPORTED JERUSALEM EDITOR, AKRAM HANIYYAH, INTERVIEWED IN ALGIERS

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 1194, 16 Jan 87 pp 43-45

[Interview with Akram Haniyyah, editor of AL-SHA'B by M. Derar; first paragraph is REVOLUTION AFRICAINE introduction]

[Text] The Palestinian press situation in the occupied territories and in Palestine, working conditions under Zionist military censorship, the role this press can play vis-a-vis Palestinian youth and masses at home and abroad, and lastly the actual situation in which the Arab people live in the occupied territories: these are the thought-provoking questions which only a Palestinian journalist of Akram Haniyyah's caliber could answer. Writer and editor-in-chief of the AL-SHA'B daily published in occupied Jerusalem, he took a stand with his pen and his writings against all Zionist ventures.

Arrested, jailed and deported from his own country, he sketched for us in an exclusive interview the role which Palestinian journalists and in a general way intellectuals may play in defending and upholding the Palestinian identity and thus the struggle against the Zionist enemy.

RA [REVOLUTION AFRICAINE]: Mr Akram Haniyyah, would you tell us of the circumstances of your deportation and the charges brought against you by the Zionist authorities.

Akram Haniyyah (A.H.): I was arrested last 3 November and told of the deportation decision signed by the Israeli military commander of the Gaza strip and the East Bank. Jailed for 55 days in a cell, in solitary confinement most of the time, I was deported from my homeland last 28 December.

The charges made against me are numerous, the Zionist military tribunal, no fooling, having pulled together no less than 311 charges which center on three main points. I was accused:

- 1) of being the coordinator of Fatah movement activities. This implied that I was the organizer of popular demonstrations, political struggles and trade union and youth activities within the Fatah framework in occupied territories;
- 2) of belonging to the national orientation committee, founded in 1978 to fight against the Camp David accords and consisting of about 20 active

Palestinian personalities, such as the martyr Fahd al-Qawasmah, the militant Muhammad Hasan Milhim (now a member of the PLO executive committee), the martyr Karim Khalif, the militant Bassam al-Shak'ah deposed mayor of Nablus, etc.; and

3) of being given responsibility by the Fatah to create a vast network of nationalist alliances among all the sympathizers and patriotic forces in occupied territories for the purpose of stepping up anti-Israeli activities.

However, at the military tribunal I acknowledged only one charge, that of struggling for the freedom and independence of my people, by saying that if this crime was the reason for my deportation, Rabin would have to prepare 1.5 million deportation orders for the Gaza strip and East Bank Palestinians.

A.H.: Actually the toughest job which may exist in the world is being a journalist in the occupied territories. In fact, we may well ask ourselves how a Palestinian press is possible under the occupation. Or even why Israel grants authorizations for newspaper dissemination in territories it occupies by force.

First, you must be aware that these dissemination authorizations are granted only in occupied Jerusalem because Israel believes it came to provide security to and pacify this region and that the holy city belongs to it.

On the other hand, in all other parts of East Bank and the Gaza strip there are neither newspapers nor magazines. In fact, by granting these dissemination authorizations, Israel is acting out of other considerations.

First, since 1967 Israel has been trying to give the world a certain image of itself. That of alleged flexibility in its dealings with the Arab citizens in the occupied Arab territories, a sort of "liberal colonialism," as Moshe Dayan used to like to call it.

Then, like every colonialism, the Zionists thought they could exert an influence on the Palestinian masses so that the latter would not decide on a clandestine press or other more radical lines in the information field.

Lastly, the third objective, the Israeli authorities felt that by authorizing this insignificant press activity they could create a schism between those at home and those abroad and thereby favor the emergence of a new Palestinian political orientation.

However, the hindrances and obstacles the Israelis place in the way of this press considerably limit its role. These limitations run from difficulties in obtaining dissemination authorization to bans pure and simple on newspaper publication which all stem from a general law dated 1945, that is, from the British protectorate over Palestine.

R.A.: Would you tell us about press working conditions in the occupied territories. In other words, how is military censorship over the press carried out?

A.H.: Military censorship is very tough because we were obliged to submit everything to the Zionist authorities. At the beginning of every year we would receive specific instructions from the office of military censorship. Everything is gone over with a fine tooth comb: news items, analyses, columns, crossword puzzles, sports, etc.

But military censorship was also physical repression of journalists who were prevented by all sorts of obstacles from doing their job. At times events took place 10 steps from the newspaper yet it was impossible for us to publish anything.

Journalists were also exposed to other vexations. Since 1967 two journalists have been kidnapped, one of whom was murdered because he was investigating confiscation and expropriation of lands in the East Bank.

There were also deportation measures and preventive arrests of journalists for the simple reason that they were suspects in the eyes of the Zionist administration. Even if they were not remanded to the courts, they were jailed for 6 months, then for 6 more months, etc. Journalists also ran the risk of being placed under house arrest. I myself was subjected to this process for two-and-a-half years; it was impossible for me to get to my work in Jerusalem. More serious, most journalists (90 percent) are forbidden to travel abroad.

Also, because of these hindrances and obstacles, the best articles are read only by the editor-in-chief and the censor. And that is why we must ask ourselves why Israel has granted these dissemination authorizations. In a way it is a challenge the Palestinian national movement has accepted.

Palestinian political orientation has accepted that because it had to use all the avenues possible even if they represented only 5 or 10 percent effectiveness.

That is why we borrowed the same approach as our journalist elders who at the beginning of this century played a key role in the national and progressive struggle against the dangers of Zionism.

And I think after 15 years of journalistic struggle we have succeeded. Otherwise how do you explain the newspaper closings and the repression befalling men of the press? That shows we have succeeded in spite of all the obstacles because we are defending the hopes and dreams of our people.

R.A.: And to deal with these maneuvers, what in your opinion must be the role played by the press in awakening the Palestinians in the occupied territories?

A.H.: As Palestinian journalists we are trying to satisfy the aspirations, hopes and dreams of our people. We use all the means in our possession to do so; even information smuggling is used. We also try to make our cause known to the world by exchanging our news items with foreign press colleagues (press, radio and television agencies, etc.). Even Israeli journalists are approached.

We send them news items which we have gone over subsequently after translation in order to get around censorship.

In this game we also try to publicize young people and new personalities in Palestinian literature and poetry and explain new phenomena appearing in society by stressing activities of youth, women, voluntary service, etc.

This by way of saying that we may play a positive role with methods which may seem negative. For example, we cannot say that we are against the Camp David accords, but we do at least say we are not in favor of them.

R.A.: For several months we have been witnessing unprecedented political and social turmoil in the occupied Arab territories; the news reported by press agencies is often contradictory and at times definitely distorted. Could you give us an accurate picture of the situation?

A.H.: Despite the fact that we are subjected to many atrocities in the occupied territories, our people are constantly in turmoil. The forms of struggle are many. They run from throwing a rock or a Molotov cocktail at a military patrol to a voluntary service action on a piece of land threatened with confiscation through takeover of the cultural heritage.

The scenario for a typical day in the life of an Arab citizen in the occupied territories fairly well illustrates the situation prevailing in the area: when he leaves home, the first contact with reality, identity check and search from the very first moments. Or he may find out that his neighbor was arrested the night before or that a piece of land was confiscated the evening before. He may also be stuck in an identity check roadblock which will prevent him from getting to his job, school or university. For schoolchildren and students, out of a 9-month school year, there are checks and searches on more than 70 days. All that brings to mind the occupation and daily repression which is logically translated into this quasi-permanent turmoil.

But the fact is that in 6 months 20 years will have passed since the occupation of the East Bank and the Gaza strip, a period which has seen many social, economic, political and cultural changes and which has been exuding new ideas.

In fact, for the first time since 1948 Palestine has opened up onto itself. Encounters of Palestinians from the East Bank with people from the Gaza strip have become frequent.

Another significant thing in more ways than one is the emergence onto the Palestinian people's daily political struggle scene of a new generation. 70 percent of the Palestinian population is under 30 years old. A very large number, then, of these inhabitants were born under the Zionist occupation and are discovering that their relatives are being jailed for belonging to the PLO. These young people have been and are growing up in demonstrations against the Zionist enemy. These young people are now leading the fight with what they have: rocks and Molotov cocktails.

A generation who the Israelis believed would forget the resistance and blend into the Zionist entity. Pure illusion because these are the young people feeding the flame of national resistance inside the occupied territories thanks to their affection for their identity and their high degree of political awareness.

In fact, several situations explain this constant turmoil:

- 1) The increase in the number of Israeli repression operations;
- 2) The many attempts at temporary solutions designed to create a "new Palestinian orientation:" and
- 3) The war started by the Amal movement against Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

R.A.: Have you any links with the Arab press published in occupied Palestine?

A.H.: Obviously. Primarily with the newspaper L'UNITE which comes out daily and is the voice of the Israeli communist party. Our connections with that publication consist mainly of mutual exchange of information. We also have, as professional journalists, links with a small number of newspapers and weeklies with which we have exchanges of articles and information.

R.A.: How do you assess what is now going on around and in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon?

A.H.: In the occupied territories we understand clearly what is going on in Lebanon.

In fact we know full well that the groups attacking the refugee camps in Lebanon are trying to follow up on what Ari'el Sharon and Israel have been unable to do, the final objective being to firm up the interdenominational division of Lebanon, i.e., split Lebanon into a series of interdenominational districts. But these groups know there is one prerequisite to reaching that point, i.e., eliminating the Palestinian presence and Palestinian arms in Lebanon which have always been a unifying factor and a solid obstacle against the dismemberment of Lebanon. There is also a certain amount of complicity between what Israel is trying to do in South Lebanon (create a Shi'ite district) and that war on the camps in order to prevent Palestinian fighters from undertaking operations inside occupied Palestine.

Otherwise, you cannot explain that just when Amal's artillery was shelling Palestinian positions (primarily at Maghdushah), Zionist planes were launching murderous raids on these same positions.

R.A.: Any word for Algerian journalists and Arab journalists in general?

A.H.: When I was informed by the International Red Cross, after a month in jail, of the forced exile of which I was the subject, I was quite saddened.

Because I did not expect to be happy in Algeria; I would be happy only when I returned to my country: Palestine. But as soon as I arrived in Algiers I felt warmth of welcome, respect and brotherly consideration given us as Palestinians.

Another thing: I was quite taken aback (sorry about the term) by the degree of awareness of my Algerian colleagues and by their grasp of questions involving the cause and struggle of the Palestinians. That eased my pain somewhat over having to leave my homeland.

Sure, solidarity of Algerian and Arab journalists with me is firstly solidarity with a colleague, but it is also solidarity with and support for the Palestinians who are struggling to recover their legitimate rights: return to their homeland.

[Box, p 45]

Calm, cool, a delivery of words with no hotheadedness and a disconcerting ease in explaining the most complex situations, Akram Haniyyah, Palestinian journalist deported from his own homeland for doing his job--keeping his compatriots informed--does not go out of his way to use striking images to speak of this or that event. Rather, key words keep cropping up in his speech, such as "paradox" in saying that the Zionist occupation has reinforced Palestinian nationalism, or "radicalism" to express the increasingly demanding feeling of younger generations vis-a-vis their elders when Palestinian rights are involved and the methods which must be used to satisfy them.

With this language or more specifically with these expressions he does not use a compressed turn of phrase but supports his statements with arguments. Which denotes great writing habits, a thorough knowledge of his compatriots' daily problems and above all a real clearheadedness in his analysis of the most complex situations.

Born 33 years ago at Ramallah in the occupied East Bank, he first went to school at Ramallah before winding up his university studies in English literature at the University of Cairo in 1975.

For 3 years in Amman, Jordan, he did his first work in the Jordanian press and was also correspondent there for a Kuwaiti newspaper. Back in his homeland again in 1978 he took the job of editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-SHA'B published in occupied Jerusalem.

During this period he was subjected for two-and-a-half years to house arrest in Ramallah and charged with belonging to the national orientation committee. It might well be added that with his journalistic and literary writings (he is also the author of several short stories), with his militant and active commitment, Akram Haniyyah is fully identified with this new generation of Palestinians.

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ALIYA-ORIENTED MAGSHIMIM MOVEMENT THRIVING

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Mar 87 p 4

[Article by Aryeh Rubinstein]

[Text] More than half a million dollars may be granted to the newly-formed aliya-oriented magshimim movement, which has already gained a reputation for originality in the World Zionist Movement by incorporating within its ranks a cross-section of Zionists from the leftist Hashomer Hatzair to Herut's Betar.

The new confederation enjoyed a tremendous boost last week when the World Zionist Executive backed the recommendation of chairman Arye Dulzin and treasurer Akiva Levinsky. The executive recommended to the Zionist General Congress, which meets later this month, that the Confederation of Magshimim Movements be allocated \$300,000, with an additional \$300,000 earmarked for it, pending the examination of its programme of activities.

The federation was founded last April at Kfar Hamaccabia, at a conference of 200 delegates of the pioneering youth movements (such as Habonim/Dror and Young Judea/Hashahar) and the four aliya organizations whose members are of college age or older (Telem, Taglit, Tehilla, and Naam - the North American Aliya Movement).

Gideon Goldbein, executive secretary of the federation, stresses that Dulzin has been trying to strengthen the position of the Hagshama movements within the Zionist movement.

The federation is aiming its aliya message at a target group it thinks will be particularly responsive: the

10,000 or so Diaspora young people who come here each year for long-term programmes (five-12 months), most of which are supported by the Jewish Agency. Only about 10 per cent of them belong to Zionist movements, Goldbein says. The idea the federation will try to get through to them is: "You've been exposed to Israel; now go back and spread the message. Become activists. Promote the Israel experience. And consider aliya for yourselves."

Except for the major metropolises in the U.S., most cities have only a few dozen youth movement members. The confederation's line is: "Pick the youth or aliya movement of your choice, but think about the Israel option."

Goldbein, who was a community emissary in Philadelphia and worked for the Joint Distribution Committee in Iran and Western Europe, is now working on a four-day happening. It is scheduled to take place in Mitzpe Ramon at the end of April for 500 young people now here on long-term programmes - university studies, kibbutz ulpan, and yeshivas.

One of the goals of that event is to enable people from the same city, who are participating in different programmes, to meet one another so that they can work as a team when they go back.

Goldbein says that the federation does not replace any existing movement or WZO department but that its goal is to align those bodies for a joint effort.

OIL DISCOVERED NEAR ASHDOD

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Mar 87 p 9

[Article by Simon Louissou]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. - Oil in commercial quantities has been pumped by reworking the old Heleg field, east of Ashkelon.

Lapidoth Corp., the government-owned drilling company, made the discovery on behalf of an Israeli consortium led by Naphtha Petroleum Corp., the state-owned oil explorer. Naphtha owns 80 per cent of the well, MGM, 10 per cent, Delek Oil Exploration Ltd., 6 per cent; Delek Fuel Corp., 2 per cent and Fed Oil Ltd., 2 per cent.

The well, known as Kohav 29, lies between Negba and Sderot.

Naphtha Managing Director Elisha Roih said yesterday that the discovery was "not a bonanza" and would not solve Israel's oil problems. Only a brief flow test has been conducted so far, enough to suggest there is enough oil in commercial quantities.

The exact extent of the find will not be known for several weeks, after extensive flow tests have been conducted. Experts estimate it is likely to be 100 barrels a day.

Roih said the company had been "playing with the concept of neglected traps in old fields," and this find proved the concept is workable. The field where the find is has been worked for 25 years and is still producing around 70 barrels a day.

The consortium is investing around \$2 million a year in exploration and has recently drilled the dry Ronni 1 and Heleg 28 wells.

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RETIREMENT AGE FOR WOMEN EQUAL TO MEN'S

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Mar 87 p 3

[Text]

The Knesset celebrated International Women's Day yesterday by taking a step further along the road to women's equality and passing into law a measure that permits women to retire at the same age as men.

The generally accepted practice in Israel has been for men to retire at 65 and for women to stop working at 60. Under the new law, men and women will retire at the same age, no matter what any collective work agreement may specify.

But women may still retire earlier if that was provided for in the agreement.

All did not go smoothly for male MKs on International Women's Day. Citizen's Rights Movement MK Dedi Zucker took exception to being barred from speaking from the rostrum, from which he had wanted to deputize for faction head Shulamit Aloni, absent from the House for some weeks because of ill-health.

But Zucker was told that only four women were to speak from the rostrum, and that if he wished he could speak from the floor.

That, said Zucker, was unfair. Women's equality was a matter of concern to both men and women.

But, apparently, the Knesset as a whole didn't agree.

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CSO: 4400/190

AL-SHAWWA DETAILS JORDANIAN AID TO GAZA

TA110845 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Mar 87 p 1

[Text] Deposed Gaza mayor Rashad Al-Shawwa said yesterday that some \$580,000 of Jordanian funds would be paid out "within two to three weeks" for projects in the Gaza Strip, as part of Jordan's five-year development plan for the territories.

Al-Shawwa returned last week from talks in Amman on Jordanian development aid, and yesterday gave details on the planned assistance in an interview at the offices of the Gaza Benevolent Society, which he heads. The society processes aid applications from the Gaza Strip, and submits project proposals to the Jordanian government, according to Al-Shawwa.

Al-Shawwa said the aid would come from the general Jordanian government budget and be distributed through the Nabulus branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank.

Aside from the lump sum of about \$580,000 (1.75 million Jordanian dinars), Jordan would for the first time pay monthly stipends of 25-35 dinars (\$8-\$15) to teachers in the Gaza Strip, Al-Shawwa said.

Al-Shawwa described how some of the Jordanian aid would be spent:

--\$178,000 for housing, including private homes.

--\$80,000 for small industries and private agricultural projects.

--Some \$75,000 for the construction of permanent structures at the Al-Karmil school, and \$10,000 for typewriters and computers for business courses at Gaza college.

--Some \$25,000 for village projects, including water-supply schemes in 'Abasan and Bani Suhaylah hear Khan Yunus.

--\$20,000 for hospital equipment, including a mobile X-ray unit for the Khan Yunus hospital. Funds will also be provided for the purchase of five ambulances as a first step towards developing a fleet of some 15 vehicles which will operate as an independent service, in coordination with the Civil Administration.

Though Jordan has declared its interest in financing the construction of a port in Gaza to direct export goods from the area, it has not yet raised the requisite funds, Al-Shawwa said.

He added that about \$1.2 million had been earmarked for Gaza in Jordan's budget for the 1987 fiscal year, and that his office was already processing applications for aid.

"The funding is far short of what was anticipated when the Jordanian plan was announced, but any money given to the territories will definitely help," Al-Shawwa said. Though none of the funds were from foreign sources, France, Germany and Italy had given commitments to help projects through the Jordanian plan.

Al-Shawwa said the recent reconvening in Amman of the Jordanian-Palestinian committee for aid to the territories would not produce results as long as there was political disagreement between Jordan and the PLO. "I don't think it will work unless there is full understanding between Jordan and the PLO on a political course to take together."

Al-Shawwa said he had received the impression in Amman that, despite the recent contacts between Jordan and the PLO their relations were "at a standstill."

Aid from the joint committee "would not hinder or obstruct the distribution of Jordanian development aid," Al-Shawwa said. "The people here are ready to receive aid from any donors. If the Jordanian government gives to the needy, they will appreciate it, and if the PLO gives money, they will approve it," Al-Shawwa said.

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CSO: 4400/183

AL-RA'Y COLUMNIST CRITICIZES ISRAELI 'PEACE OFFENSIVE'

JN280959 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 28 Mar 87 p 32

[Political editor's article in the "Spotlights" column: "The Israeli Peace Offensive"]

[Text] In the past 2 days the Israelis have launched a peace offensive against us and the world. No one understands why all the parties have contributed to making it a success, whether through the meeting of dignitaries with Shim'on Peres, the dialogue Abba Eban and (Ura Tamir) conducted with elements close to the PLO, or during the 2 hours in which Peres sat in the Israeli Radio studios and answered listeners' questions with hair-raising lies and with a crowning touch by Mustafa Khalil, the godfather of Camp David and the patron of peace in Egypt.

Of what importance are the three points reached by those who held a dialogue with Eban and (Tamir)?

What benefits did the dignitaries gain from their meeting with Peres? And what answers did the pedants get from Peres in over 2 hours other than the fact he does not know whether the (Bitar) settlement currently being built on 5,000 dunums of land in Husan is being built on land which has been confiscated or not?

Have any of the interlocutors, those who met with Peres and those who heard his answers, received an answer that Israel is ready to withdraw from the land in exchange for peace? No one asked such a question and if someone put forth such a question he did not get a direct reply. Everybody gave undue attention to marginal issues, such as the international conference, the participation of the PLO or other Palestinians, whether to establish a port in Gaza, and opening Egyptian borders to traffic or maintaining this movement only through the bridges via Jordan.

For the past 2 days we have given the Israelis every opportunity to launch a peace offensive against us unprecedented since Al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Why has this taken place? Why is everyone content to observe media silence toward this boundless "courage"?

If the dignitaries or those identified with the PLO enjoy privileged status or have influence, why then do they not negotiate or go it alone? Why then

do they need Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO, as well as the five big powers and the United Nations? Do they consider themselves the vanguard of those eager to make peace or has any party entrusted them to do this?

If we assume all this has taken place with good intentions, then we must say that in spite of the tragedies of the aggression the Zionists have been launching against us for more than a century, we have not yet grasped their behavior of their political and media maneuvers. The Israelis' unofficial talk and media talk mean nothing. But the Israelis' talk on the record is something else of which the pedants have never heard the like. How much time did it take the Egyptians and how many efforts did they exert for 900 square meters in Tabah and for finally referring the dispute to arbitration?

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CSO: 4400/183

AL-RA'Y SAYS ARAB POWER 'REAL KEY' TO MIDEAST PEACE

JN290842 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Mar 87 pp 1, 20

[Editorial: "Intrinsic Power Is the Key to Peace"]

[Text] In continuation of the sterile game played by Shamir and Peres in which the former plays the role of the rigid hawk who is against the international conference and the latter plays the role of the lenient dove who is for an international conference provided it is held under conditions depriving it of any substance and worthiness; we say in continuation of this miserable game, Shamir made an arrogant statement yesterday in which he said that the Arab inclination toward a political settlement is the outcome of the policy which has been pursued by previous Israeli governments, that there is no need for Israel to rush into a solution, and that duty calls on Israel to adhere to the principle of direct negotiations and to the Camp David accords, which it considers the only possible basis for negotiations!

In short, Shamir's statement means that Israel's aggressive policy has borne fruit, that the current Arab situation will not cause Israel to rush into resolving its dispute with the Arabs, and that Israel can enforce the Camp David accords on the Arabs as the only basis for negotiations!

Thus it becomes clear that Arab divisions is the card on which Shamir is betting and that coercion is still the basis which he wants to use in any political process between Israel and the Arabs.

Israel's continued adherence to its aggressive policy means that the possibility of starting a peace process in the region is still remote. It also means that Arab power in resorting to different options is the only method which will cause Israel to abandon its aggressive policy and agree to pursue a peace course. Since this is the situation, the Arabs have no choice but to build their intrinsic power so they will be in a position to exercise these options. No doubt, the Arabs recall Jordan's call a long time ago for building the intrinsic Arab power. Jordan still calls for and strives to achieve this power.

Therefore, we must be frank and say that it is not enough for the Arabs to advocate an international conference. They must also build their intrinsic power, because this is the real key to peace and also because this alone will expedite the international conference and create the conviction among the Israeli aggressors and their supporters that just comprehensive peace is the soundest option and that the general interest calls for agreeing to this option without further procrastination and delay!

IMPACT OF WOMEN WORKING IN AL-MAFRAQ DISCUSSED

Amman THE JERUSALM STAR in English 26 Mar 87 p 17

[Article by Margaret Campbell Boeker]

[Text] "AT FIRST, my father was against my taking this job. But my mother thought it was a good idea. We needed the income." Jumana pulls a length of blue thread from the spindle on top of the machine, dips her head and squints as she pushes the filament through the eye of the needle. As she looks up, there is a trace of a smile. "Now that we are living so much better, my father doesn't mind so much. In fact, I think he's secretly proud of me," she says.

The girl at the next sewing desk shoves a green plastic laundry basket along the tiled floor. It comes to a stop near Jumana's leg. She reaches over and pulls out a pair of blue work slacks on which she is to sew the beltloops. These trousers brought her to fifty-six out of her day's goal of 170 pairs.

Jumana has joined a group of 24 young women in an industrial sewing project in Mafraq, a town of approximately 20,000 inhabitants in northern Jordan. The production workers are mainly unmarried women who wish to increase their family income while in the company of other women in their 17-25 age bracket. Drawing on a traditional craft they had learned as young girls, and by undergoing additional training, they have been able to modify and re-direct their skills in domestic sewing toward production-line manufacturing.

The commercial sewing project was established in 1984 after a US-funded feasibility study showed that of seven possible income-generating projects for rural women in Jordan, a factory of

industrial uniforms located in Mafraq would have the best chance for success.

"The extensive preliminary studies done by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to determine the structure of the community, its resources and its attitudes towards particular types of work really paid off in pointing us in the right direction," says Mr Lewis Reade, Director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Jordan.

With an additional support grant of \$254,000 from USAID, CRS was able to lay the foundations for a commercial enterprise. Sister Leona Donahue, the CRS Country Representative, together with Mrs Aysar Akrawi, the Project Director, handled the rental and adaptation of an appropriate premises, the purchasing and installation of industrial machinery, the designing of the training syllabus, the organization of the production lines and the recruitment of qualified workers.

One vital component of the project, the training of supervisors and a production technician, proved to be more difficult to institute than had been expected. No training programme in industrial sewing existed in the country. There was, however, CRS-funded school uniform factory in the city of Karak, a four hour drive by car from Mafraq. The only possible solution to the training problem was to send the women to live for four weeks in rented accommodations and work in the Karak factory, following a training syllabus

which would have to be designed by CRS. Locating qualified applicants who were willing to leave their homes for the first time and move into a strange city proved to be a major task. But after a lengthy search, five women who agreed to the arrangement were selected to make the temporary move, and learn all aspects of commercial garment production, supervision and quality control.

In March 1985, twenty production workers began factory training in sewing commercial uniforms. After two months, the women were able to produce uniforms of competitive quality in the Amman market. By December of the same year, still under training, the women were turning out 36 different types of items for hotels, laboratories, hospitals, the armed forces and airline maintenance operations. Their sales covered 75 per cent of their operating costs.

Even though this represented a formidable achievement in one year, the women knew they had to increase their production, continue to upgrade the quality and lower the per-item sales price in order to attract the attention of future clients.

In 1986, their second year of production, they reduced wastage to a minimum and kept accurate records of production timing and problems on an item by item basis. The quality and output of each production worker was also recorded so that identification and correction of errors in production and the immediate upgrading of skills could be provided. As a result of this monitoring, the women were able to increase their production and sales to the point where the enterprise was close to self-supporting by the end of the calendar year.

"For a factory to go from zero production to paying for over 90 per cent of its operating overhead in two years is remarkable anywhere in the world," says Mr Reade. "This sewing project, which employs women and is controlled by women, is now the largest commercial operation in the city of Mafrq and the third largest garment operation in the whole country."

The 75 different commercial garments produced in the factory have now replaced many similar imported items, and they have

won an edge above many other locally-produced uniforms in terms of sewing quality and the fabrics used. One of the indications of the acceptance of the products is that clients have been placing second orders larger than the first. The factory has also attracted the attention of the Jordanian government which has signed contracts large enough to keep the women occupied until February 1988.

While the project is off to a booming start, there have been many unforeseen problems. Some of the early ones centered around the adaptation of the women and their families to her full-time, formal job. The women's fathers and brothers pressured them to fulfil their domestic and tribal responsibilities to the same extent as before, and the women felt obligated to respond. Daily preparation of family meals, assistance in the harvesting of crops, and preparations for weddings and other festivities all resulted in excessive absenteeism in the sewing factory.

Through home visits by Rula Qumei, a CRS community development specialist, families began to understand that the women's fulfilling their job responsibilities was in their interest if they wished to raise their standard of living. For more than 40 per cent of the families, this factory salary of JD 50 per month increased their total family income by more than 100 per cent. For the rest of the households, the percentage increase was less, but still represented a considerable contribution. Each family quickly saw that the loss of the sewing job would affect them in many ways. As a result, most of the families tried to work out their logistical household problems with less dependence on the production worker.

With time, many parents not only accepted the fact that their daughters wanted to be more productive, but became proud of their increased skills and contributions to the families' welfare. This change of attitude provided the women with more self confidence. Before long, they began to take part in household decision-making.

Nabila, one of the production workers, says as she slips the front of a lab coat under the pressure foot: "I am proud of my work

and feel better about myself. I now share in decisions at home, and my opinions in matters concerning the house are highly regarded." Much of the women's input revolves around how the additional income should be spent, with the young women stressing basic needs as opposed to the desire of some family members for luxury goods such as televisions and tape recorders.

With an improvement in the life-style of the participating families, the change in attitude toward women's work outside the home began to spread to the community. "The few Mafrag women who were already employed were involved either in government services or education which provided both security and status," says Sr. Leona. "The concept of women working in an industrialized sewing centre was totally foreign to the Mafrag area and in the beginning it evoked community suspicion and hostility." But within a few months, as the benefits to the participating families became noticeable, the situation began to change. One young worker, raising her voice above the whir of the electric fabric-cutter, comments on this reverse of attitude. "My friends and neighbours used to ridicule my work and think that I was wasting my time, but recently two of my friends have applied for a job at the centre." Two years after the inception of the project, 150 women are on the production

worker waiting list

While there are still issues to be resolved, particularly that of locating a reliable and inexpensive source for the annual purchase of 24,000 metres of quality fabric, and the establishment of a vibrant marketing programme, this pilot project appears to be stable enough to provide continuing employment for Mafrag's women. With its record of success, the factory should soon be able to establish its own credit-line. "This," Mrs. Akwari says "would enable the women to cut their costs by importing their fabric directly instead of purchasing the same fabric from the local merchants."

To increase economic benefits to more Jordanian women, CRS is considering expanding the sewing project by establishing a children's clothing factory. This new operation would be combined in a profit-sharing programme with a CRS tourist-oriented sewing project already underway in the city of Jerash and the Mafrag uniform factory. A joint outlet for all three enterprises in the capital of Amman should enhance the marketing potential the sales volume and the financial benefits for all the workers.

Hopefully the acceptance of the Mafrag project by a traditionally conservative community which needs help in raising its standard of living will encourage Jordanians to include women in other economic enterprises.

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NEW IRRIGATION PROJECT DISCUSSED

Professors Interviewed on Project

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 19 Mar 87 p 12

[Article by Najwa Najjar]

[Text] AMMAN — Experimenting with agricultural production in areas where rainfall does not exceed 200 millimetres annually could provide an answer to stemming the spread of desertification in Jordan and the Near East.

A research site 50 kilometres southeast of Amman has for the past year and half been conducting studies on the optimum agricultural production on lands considered as semi-arid and prone to desertification, said Dr. Mahmoud Al Dweiri, Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Jordan. "Our objective is to develop a comprehensive package needed to cope with desertification problem in Jordan and areas with similar environmental conditions," said Dr. Dweiri.

Addressing a group of journalists visiting the site, Dr. Dweiri said: "There are other sites experimenting with production in the desert, but none have the conditions of this site with less than 200mm of rainfall and extreme temperatures, either very high or very low."

This pioneer project in Jordan is part of the University of Jordan's special action programme: fight against hunger. "The Faculty of Agriculture at the university found this project appropriate since most of the countries in this region are low rainfall areas suffering from desertification," said the dean.

"We are testing simple techniques applicable to simple farms," said R. Theib Y. Oweis, irrigation and water consultant for the research site. "Once an experiment proves to be successful, we will invite farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture so that they can, if they wish, adopt the idea," said Dr. Oweis.

Dr. Oweis, from the Faculty of Agriculture, is one of the 18 faculty members participating in the research activities. Five research assistants specialising in agricultural science and four graduate students awarded scholarships to conduct research in agriculture are also part of them.

EC grant

A grant for the project has been provided by the European Community (EC). The 750,000 EC units (ECU) grant forms 53 per cent of the total cost, and the rest of the expenses are covered by contributions from the University of Jordan. Mr. Romano Lantini, head of the EC Commission in Jordan said: "The grant was made to the project to improve agricultural production and to enhance self reliance in semi-arid areas." The Jordanian government has shown its support by offering the 200 hectares of land for experimentation.

The reporters were shown several of the experiment, on a field trip arranged by the Faculty of Agriculture to see the progress

of the research site. Dr. Awni Taimeh, the technical director of the project and a professor from the Faculty of Agriculture told the reporters "there are eight major projects with several experiments within each." The projects fall under four types of management: land, plant, water, and livestock based on the site selection and collection of information on soil, water and climate.

Ground water

Research has shown that ground water may not be sufficient for agriculture in this area by the year 2000 since a major portion is allocated for human and industrial uses. Therefore, the option left is to establish and develop the best means for utilising surface water, and upgrading water use efficiency for the adopted practices. Due to seasonal fluctuations in climate in this zone, project activities were selected to suit such conditions.

"For a good crop, 600mm of water is needed. With water harvesting we can collect the rainfall into a smaller area to obtain this amount," said Dr. Taimeh. Using plastic or paraffin to cover different areas of land, or just leaving some plots of land uncovered, the researchers are trying to find the optimum area and material which allows for the greatest amount of water to run off towards target areas or into barrels.

"We use techniques and experiences of other countries, but slightly modified to our own conditions and in order to make use of our own local materials," said Dr. Oweis. "For example, we have our own measurement devices, and the plastic and paraffin is made locally."

Presently six hectares are being irrigated and under experimentation. The researchers are trying to determine the consumption use for selected crops, to establish some practical techniques for reducing evaporation in water storage and to select the best field irrigation methods.

Earth dams

Three earth dams were con-

structed by the University of Jordan. "They were designed to be as efficient as possible and to get the maximum capacity at the lowest costs," said Dr. Oweis. Between JD 2,000 - 2,500 was the cost of each dam which holds about 60,000 cubic metres of water. A concrete dam to hold the same amount of water would have cost JD 30,000, added Dr. Oweis.

Research has shown that soil type in this zone is found on 35 per cent of the total area in Jordan. These areas were not included in development plans over the last decades. Furthermore, this type of area is being damaged by various degradation and desertification processes. The research site is trying to determine the best land use, agri-

culture potential and production of different crops applicable to these conditions. Plants are being tested for their suitability in different soil areas, and their responses under optimum management is being studied, continued Dr. Oweis.

As well as maintaining soil productivity, the researchers strive to improve soil fertility. Different mixes and concentrations of organic and inorganic sources of plant nutrients are mixed with the soil, said Dr. Butros Hattar, a professor in the Faculty of Agriculture.

According to Dr. Taimeh, "badly depleted soil is a problem for wheat production." He showed reporters the areas designated for wheat, and said that dealing with this problem calls for daily irrigation during germination. Also different levels of nitrogen and fertilisers are added, he said.

Run-off problem

All the professors noted the problem of run-off water as being the biggest stumbling block. Fertile ground reduces the rate of run-off and deep percolation and by being able to estimate the water requirement of crops, there is less chance of wasted water, they said. In addition, the researchers will continue to test different tillage practices and means to reduce transpiration and soil

water evaporation, and to increase water holding capacity of soils.

An experiment where no irrigation had been used was also shown to the reporters, to identify crop species which can establish themselves under natural habitat. The plot included cereals, trees, and forage crops. Forty two dunums were planted last April with a survival rate of 70 per cent," said Dr. Oweis. The project aims to study the natural vegetation for its feed potential and soil conservation, and to select suitable crops by evaluating the different crop species for agronomic, economic and other quality traits under different soil moisture conditions.

Dr. Dweiri told the journalists, "we are looking at soils and plants, but we have in mind to look at livestock management as well, since we want an integrated approach." He also said that the project expected to face problems but would keep working depending on the support it receives..

Journalists Tour Site

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 16 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by Pam Dougherty]

[Text] DRIP IRRIGATION in the Jordan Valley, sprinkler irrigated wheat in the southern arid lands — they are just two of the approaches to boosting food production that have been tried in Jordan in the past few years in an attempt to reduce Jordan's growing food import bill.

But a unique project now underway at Muwaqar, 50 kilometres south east of Amman, may, in the long run, prove to be the most important approach of all.

The project's name, "Agricultural Production in the Semi-Arid Zones and Areas Suffering from Desertification" is a little unwieldy, its aims are precise — to assess the sustainable productive potential of the semi-arid lands that make up 35 per cent of Jordan's total area.

The project was established 18 months ago on 200 hectares of land provided by the government. Eighteen faculty members and five post-graduate students from the University of Jordan Faculty of Agriculture are working on the project which has received JD 700,000 funding from the European Economic Commission (EEC) under its "Fight against Hunger" programme.

Dr Awni Taimeh of Jordan University, who is technical director of the project, says it is the first in the Middle East to take a comprehensive approach to the study of the agricultural possibilities of areas which, with an average annual rainfall of only 150 mm, have generally been left out of agricultural development programmes.

The aim of the project team now is to develop practical and inexpensive package of measures, sustainable in even the lowest rainfall years, which will boost production while also improving the soil quality and halting the desertification process.

The land chosen for the project is typical of Jordan's semi-arid regions and it's daunting. The average rainfall is 150 mm per year but a study of the rainfall patterns of the past 45 years shows that it can range from a record high of 790 mm, recorded in 1948, to absolutely nothing in severe drought years.

Years of overgrazing have left the ground with almost no plant cover and the occasional good year of rain has probably worsened the situation by encouraging farmers to plant a wheat crop as in succeeding dry years the ploughed land is all the more susceptible to erosion.

The entire project area has now been fenced off to prevent any grazing and allow the plant cover to regenerate. Then, within the overall area, a range of experiments is underway which include testing for the best means of conserving run-off and improving water use efficiency, improvement of soil fertility and maintenance of soil productivity, the increase of the natural vegetation through the improvement of local species and the introduction of new ones and testing for possible field crops.

The first phase of the project included a detailed soil study which has now produced a soil and land-use map and a plant study to identify the flora in the project and surrounding areas, the selection of indigenous plants based on their performance in the natural habitat and the study of the survival mechanisms and drought tolerance of these species.

In the second phase the project team have moved on to a number of sub-projects.

The project site is now criss-crossed by shallow ditches ploughed on the land's contour lines as a measure to prevent wind and water erosion.

Some areas have been fenced off as test plots to see how well the land will re-generate when left totally undisturbed. Others are being planted with atyplex and other fodder shrubs.

Soil fertility improvement trials are underway using various qualities of manure, sewage sludge and chemical fertilizers to test which is the most suitable type and quantity to restore soil fertility and improve its water holding capacity.

Other trials are being done on wheat crops using different applications of nitrogen fertilizer, yet others are testing the level of erosion caused by the sprinkler watering of forage crops.

And the use of sprinklers is a reminder of the vital work being done in water harvesting.

Dr Deeb Oweis, Assistant Professor of Soils and Irrigation at Jordan University, who is directing the water harvesting and usage activities, explains that, unlike the new grain growing projects underway in southern and eastern Jordan, this project depends entirely on rainfall and surface run-off with no use of underground supplies contemplated.

A first step was the building of three earth dams to hold some of the water that flows across the land after rain. The three have a total capacity of 60,000 cm, 12-15,000 cm in the first dam, 30,000 cm in the second and 15,000 cm in the third.

Dr Oweis says that 60,000 cm is the maximum quantity that the project site can conserve but that after the most recent storms in the area which produced 20mm of rain, some one million cm of water passed over the spillway between the first and second dams and this could be utilized on other land in the area.

The dams are not only effective, they were also very cheap — in keeping with the project aim of developing affordable techniques. Dr Oweis points out that where it would cost JD 30,000 to bring 60,000 cm of water to the site by pipes, the dams cost only JD 2,000 each.

The question now under study is 'what is the best strategy for using the water?' Dr Oweis says the factors which must be considered are the long term storage capacity of the dam itself, the rainfall patterns of the area and, on the agricultural side, which particular food crops, fodder crops and land regeneration activity would put the water to its best use.

The other aspect of water harvesting is the local channelling of surface run off on the project site itself. A series of plots, following the slope of the land, have been established, some with a plastic covering, others with a covering of paraffin wax, the third type without covering, and the run-off is channelled to one corner of the plot. The amount of water collected is then measured to establish the optimum plot size and surface cover. This technique is particularly well suited to tree growing and each of the project plots has been planted with an almond tree.

The area under study has, of course, traditionally been pre-eminently used for grazing and the potential for livestock production is an important aspect of the project. The land regeneration and fodder crop tests are the first stage but actual trials will have to wait until the available grazing has improved.

Dr Butros Hattar of Jordan University, who is responsible for soil fertility testing and trials at the project, says the trials will be to assess not simply how many animals can graze a given area but the length of the grazing period and the appropriate times of year and of the growing cycle of the plants. He says even a very short grazing period can be harmful if, for example, animals are allowed to graze when the plants are setting seed as this can destroy the possibility of new growth.

Dr Taimeh believes that at least three to five more years are needed before proper experimentation at the project site can be completed. The team then hopes to have developed a package of practical and affordable measures which could be used throughout Jordan's semi-arid areas. He estimates that an individual property would need to be at least 200 dunums or larger areas could be developed on some co-operative basis.

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MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST AIR POLLUTION

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 26-27 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by Fred Donovan]

[Text] AMMAN — Jordan's rapid economic development and rising standard of living in the past decades have brought with them the attendant problem of pollution with which the developed world is all too familiar. Though water pollution from industrial waste has received much attention, the pollution of the air from auto and industrial emissions has not, until recently, been studied.

"There is a danger of an air pollution episode in Amman," warns Mr. Ayman Al Hassan, director of the air pollution division at the Royal Scientific Society (RSS). This danger, while still only a potential one, needs to be addressed, says Mr. Al Hassan.

Citing an air pollution episode in Athens in which 200 people were injured, Mr. Al Hassan cautions about the similar topography of Amman. Like Athens, Amman is built among hills. "This restricts natural ventilation," he states.

The significant increase in the number of cars, combined with the lack of effective emission controls and the narrowness of the streets between the hills, threatens to create problems. According to Mr. Al Hassan, 80 per cent of the small and medium cars in Jordan are located in the Amman area. Many of these use diesel oil which emits sulphur dioxide which when burned can cause permanent damage to the respiratory system. The levels

emitted by these diesel burning cars he estimates to be three times the international limit.

Monitoring units

The RSS, in cooperation with the Canadian-based International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and Environment Canada, has begun monitoring the level of pollutants in the air. IDRC is providing the financial assistance, and Environment Canada the equipment and technical assistance.

Through this Jordanian-Canadian cooperation, four fixed and one mobile monitoring systems became operational in February of last year. The four fixed systems are located in the Amman area — downtown, Marka, Jabal Al Nasr, and at the RSS headquarters near the University of Jordan. They are measuring the levels of carbon monoxide, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and dust. Because the monitoring has not been going on long enough, the RSS as yet does not have any firm figures, according to Mr. Al Hassan, who is the project's director.

Once the study has been completed and some firm results arrived at, he suggests that the data be used to set up national standards. "We decided to start early to be able to set up national standards before the problem gets out of hand," he says.

In full agreement with the need for national standards is Dr. Sufian Al Tel, director of the Department of Environment and the Department of Regional Planning. He concurs that standards should be established to regulate industrial and auto emissions. "We need the data before we can draw up specifications. They are the easy part," he says.

His department is looking to acquire instruments or to pay the RSS to conduct studies of air pollution levels. Unfortunately, the government did not allocate money for such a study in its five-year development plan, although it did endorse the idea, relates Dr. Tel.

Asphalt factories relocated

Though his department has not conducted a study of the level of pollutants in the air, it has already taken steps to curb air pollution, according to Dr. Al Tel. One example is the department's action against the asphalt mixing factories. Many of these factories, located to the west of Amman, were spewing dust and pollutants into the air, and the predominantly west-to-east winds were carrying this into Amman.

Through a licensing system, the department succeeded in having the factories moved to the east of Amman, so that the winds took the dust into the desert. Also the factories were required to install filters, relates Dr. Tel. "I regard this as a good step for the environment in Amman," he asserts.

Another area where the Department of Environment has succeeded in lessening air pollution is at the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company (JPMC) plant in Ruseifa. According to an article in the Jordan Times in February 1985, the residents of Ruseifa were complaining about the dust pollution caused by the plant. As a result of the construction of open cast mines built by the JPMC in the 1960s, phosphate dust was being blown in the air in amounts potentially dangerous to the health.

According to one resident, Mr. Sim'aan Qa'war, the dust was so bad that: "If you pass through the city during the night you feel as if you are going through a tunnel full of thick dust where you can hardly see anything."

The Department of Environment succeeded in having the Ruseifa mine closed, according to Dr. Tel. The problem came to his attention while he was serving on a University of Jordan committee to review Masters theses.

Phosphate dust

One of the students wrote his Masters thesis on the problem of air pollution in Ruseifa and the potential dangers. As a result of the information, Dr. Tel moved to have the plant shut down because of the difficulty of reducing the dust from the plant to acceptable levels.

"But, we don't like this solution (closing down factories)," he states. "We find that most factory owners are willing to cooperate with us. The response from them is usually good," he concludes.

On the problem of auto emission control, Dr. Tel judges that more needs to be done. "We need to have emission control requirements be part of getting a license. The emission controls we have are not being implemented as we would like," he asserts. He suggests that cars be tested once a year and that mobile measuring instruments be used to check cars in the street.

Acid rain

An attendant problem of air pollution is acid rain. When gases, such as carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide, come into contact with moisture, they form acids, which precipitation carries down to the ground; these acids can damage buildings and kill plant life, explains Dr. Elias Salameh of the Water Research and Study Centre at the University of Jordan. The acids can find their way into the food chain through animals grazing the contaminated grass.

His centre has conducted studies on acid levels in rain water.

From his study, he has found that the level of acidity is not a problem for Jordan. "We have a lot of dust in the air which absorbs the acidity ... very seldom do we have acid rain," he explains.

Lead emissions

There is a problem, however, with lead emissions from cars, according to Dr. Salameh. Most of the automobiles in Jordan still use leaded fuel. Lead, which is poisonous in sufficient amounts, is emitted into the air by cars burning leaded fuel. His Centre, after taking samples of rain water from the streets in Amman, found significant levels of lead. This is a problem which Dr. Salameh thinks needs attention.

Thus, air pollution remains a potential problem for Jordan as the country continues to grow economically. Fortunately, it is a problem which is gradually coming under increased study. If national standards are set up and enforced both for factories and automobiles, Jordan could lessen the health problems that air pollution is causing in more industrialised countries.

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PRESS ASSOCIATION ELECTS NEW OFFICERS

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 14 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by Rana Sabbagh]

[Text] AMMAN — Rakan Al Majali was elected president of the Jordan Press Association (JPA) on Friday with a 10-vote margin against his only rival, Ibrahim Sakkijha, who secured 81 votes in an election which saw an unprecedented turnout in the 34-year history of the association.

In addition to electing Mr. Majali, the 174 journalists who took part in the four-hour balloting process at the Amman Chamber of Commerce also elected a nine-member executive council. Both the president and the council will serve for a two-year term.

Observers said the high turnout — only 10 members were absent — amid snow and bad weather reflected an increasing interest among Jordanian journalists in the workings of the JPA.

Technically, the nine-member council was elected Friday but the voting process involved only six of the seats since the JPA law of 1983 provides for three seats to be reserved for representatives of the private sector in press and publishing business. These three seats were won by nomination by Fakhri Abu Hamdeh (editor-in-chief of the weekly Fares magazine), Fayez Hamdan (editor-in-chief of the Al Ithinen weekly) and Hassan Al Tal (editor-in-chief of the Al Liwa weekly).

A total of 10 candidates vied for the remaining six of the council seats. They represented the

three major press establishments in the Kingdom — the Jordan Press Foundation Company Limited which publishes Al Ra'i and the Jordan Times, the Jordan Press and Publishing Company Ltd. which publishes Al Dustour and the Dar Al Shaab Company for Printing, Publishing and Distribution Ltd. which publishes Sawt Al Shaab — and the state-run Jordan News Agency, Petra. The following won the six seats: Marwan Al Shra'leh, Petra (99 votes), Mousa Al Azrai, Petra (96), Ahmad Zougailat, Petra (95), Yousef Al Absi, Al Ra'i (90), Ahmad Hisban, Al Dustour (83) and Fakhri Al Nimri, Sawt Al Shaab (75). The four who lost the race were: Mohammad Al Abhadi (Petra — 78), Abdullah Hamdan (freelance journalist — 71), Mohammad Said Midieh (freelance — 58) and Zouhdi Al Badri (freelancer — 41). None of the 18 female members of the JPA ran for office.

Journalists interviewed by the Jordan Times appeared to be evenly split between Mr. Majali and Mr. Sakkijha. Both candidates are well known for their wide contacts, strong personalities and flexibility, the journalists said. Furthermore, they hardly differed on their policy goals during campaigning which included an open debate.

Their pledges centred on augmenting the revenues of the association's budget and to expand the coverage of the recently introduced pension scheme.

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH INDIA--New Delhi--The minutes of the meetings of the joint Jordanian-Indian committee were signed in New Delhi today. Muhammad al-Saqqaf, under secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, signed the minutes for Jordan, while (Ranjan), under secretary of the Indian Ministry of Trade, signed for India. The minutes provide for increasing bilateral trade and include an agreement on the quantities of phosphate, potash, and fertilizers which will be imported by India in 1987. Practical measures have been taken to help implement joint projects which will serve Jordanian products and depend entirely on Jordanian production. [Excerpt] [Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 27 Mar 87 JN] /6091

AMBASSADOR TO MALDIVES--The Council of Ministers has decided to appoint Fakhri Abu Talib, Jordan's ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, as nonresident ambassador to the Republic of Maldives. [Text] [Amman PETRA-JNA in Arabic 1410 GMT 31 Mar 87 JN] /6091

NEW RED SEA ROAD--Work is underway for building a 32-kilometre road between Zara and Ghor Haditha in the Jordan Valley. The road which goes along the Dead Sea coast will link Sweimeh north of the Dead Sea with the Safi-Aqaba Road, according to Mr. Khalaf Hawwari, under secretary of the Ministry of Public Works. He said that the cost of building the road is expected to amount to JD 18 million. The road will link the northern Jordan Valley region with the south, and the Aqaba port. The new road will shorten the existing one by 60 kilometres and will reduce traffic congestion on the Desert Highway that links Amman with Aqaba. According to Mr. Hawwari, the project will take 48 months to complete, and is being built by a consortium of local, Turkish and Swiss construction firms. [Text] [Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 24 Mar 8 p 3] /13104

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LIVES, OPPORTUNITIES OF CAMP WOMEN DEPICTED

Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 28 Mar 87 p 5

[Article by Zahra Al Bahr]

[Text] THE difficulty of writing about camps in relation to women is that they contain so many highly contradictory realities that to select one aspect at the expense of others leads to gross distortion. Within one small social space we can find women who run projects, and women who only leave their homes to shop; women who have studied medicine in the USSR, and women who were taken out of school at 13 to marry; girls whose brothers encouraged them to join a resistance group, others whose brothers burned their clothes to prevent them from going out; girls who fight to defend the camp during sieges, others whose only concern is the latest fashions. A camp is a kaleidoscope: Depending on where one looks or to whom one listens, it is a crucible of change or a bastion of conservatism.

One tradition has presented the camps as places where certain kinds of "progress" have taken place. Evidence selected ranges from falling rates of infant mortality due to improved health services (most women give birth in hospitals nowadays, and midwives have been "upgraded"); rising educational levels, result of free schooling from 6 to 16; opportunities for skilled employment; later age at first marriage, and the dying out of *ijhari* (coercive) marriage; the break-up of the traditional patriarchal household; and the widespread involve-

ment of women in the resistance movement. All this is true. But it is important to guard against two kinds of distortion: First, the extent of these changes should not be overestimated; second, they should not be seen as beginning with the uprooting of 1948. All the most outstanding characteristics of camp women, whether it is their capacity for struggle, or for rebuilding their homes, or for making money stretch, grow directly out of their peasant past, and can only be understood with this time frame in mind.

Take education: It is true that there were very few schools for girls in Palestinian villages — only 46 by 1944/45, but the demand for them was building up. Girls' schools were established in the 1880s in urban centres, and the cities had a cultural influence over the countryside. Further, the leaders of the national movement attached importance to the education of women. And by the '40s, there were already women teachers ready to work in villages. Old women in camps often talk about their struggles to be allowed to attend school; hence the pressure they put on their daughters to take the chance of schooling. Many a girl who has succeeded in "completing" her education, i.e. reaching university, has done so because she was supported by an illiterate mother or grandmother.

In contrast to Palestinian vil-

lages, camps provided free schooling, with the result that, by 1979, overall illiteracy had dropped to 35 per cent. In addition, the proportion of girls in elementary classes was high (85 per cent in Lebanon in 1977/78). However behind these encouraging statistics we find several dark areas. Less than half the girls complete the whole UNRWA cycle to gain the *brevet* diploma that would open up for them some kind of vocational training, while the proportion that continue into secondary school is very low indeed. PLO census-takers in 1978/79 found that 22 per cent of the female population aged above 10 had reached the primary certificate, 8.5 per cent the intermediate certificate, 2.8 per cent the secondary certificate, while only 0.9 per cent had been to university. Perhaps the most startling discovery is the low number of women with any kind of vocational diploma: one cause for concern is residual illiteracy in the schoolage population: in Shatila 3.4 per cent of female illiterates were aged between 10 and 19.

This was the picture shortly before the 1982 war, when resistance scholarships were plentiful and incomes high. If statistics were available today, they would show even fewer girls going on to secondary school, and higher rates of drop-out all through. Lina, a Shatila girl aged 17, an excellent student who was aiming at university, was suddenly catapulted into marrying a young man with a job in the Gulf by parents who had had genuine ambitions for her, and had always proclaimed their intention of letting their daughters choose whom and when to marry. But times had changed, and they had eight other children to feed and educate. People say this is happening on a wide scale.

As to employment, anyone who visits the Beirut camps will be impressed by the visibility of women working in social institutions — around 70 per cent of Palestine Red Crescent workers are women. Moreover, today, women of camp background are often found *in charge*, responsi-

ble for a local centre or a section within an institution. Ten years ago, direction lay very clearly outside the camps, and there was a wider gap in qualifications and powers; whereas in Shatila today there are three or four women of whom the word "powerful" can legitimately be used, who control resources. But before extolling this as proof of "progress," we need to realise how contingent it is on the existence of jobs and resources. The number professionally employed in fact is very slight, and the possibilities for professional training available to the majority of girls, never extensive, are deeply threatened by present insecurity.

Second, it is only possible to represent the rather low employment rates of camp women as "progress" if we assume that they come out of a background of narrowly defined domesticity. But there is nothing really new about Palestinian women working. In Palestine the role of peasant women in agricultural production was a strong one — they not only produced, but marketed their produce, and were used to handling money. They also possessed a range of artisanal skills other than the embroidery for which they are best known: Weaving, pottery, many kinds of food preservation, the making of domestic equipment, and parts of houses. They also managed large households that produced as well as consumed, a better basis than

nuclear family from which to launch into "social production." It is important to recall these historical facts because, on the one hand, camp conditions caused the loss rather than development of these capacities, and on the other because camp women still possess the qualities bred by their foremothers' productive/managerial roles: physical strength, mobility, resourcefulness, and manual dexterity. What such women can become is well illustrated by those who have risen from a modest educational base to senior positions in institutions such as the Kanafani Foundation and Najdeh. Both have made a special point of encouraging women from camp back-

grounds to upgrade their qualifications.

But however exciting these manifestations are, they must be set against the stark fact of lack of training and employment openings. The provision of basic literacy to 80 per cent of girls in camps did not, even in good times, open up to them the possibility of skilled employment. This is clear from the low rate of camp women's participation in the labour force, 6.5 per cent according to the PLO census in 1979 (based on five camps), compared with 18 per cent for Lebanese women, and 11 per cent for Syrian women (1975 figures). The gate to all kinds of professional training (including nursing), is the *baccalaureat*, and between the *brevet*, when UNRWA schooling ends, and the *baccalaureat* stretch three to four years of expensive secondary school. True, a handful of camp girls were beginning to be admitted to UNRWA's vocational training centre at Sibleen (closed since 1983). True, resistance scholarships enabled another handful to reach university in Lebanon or abroad. But such chances were not available to the majority. For them the vocational training courses conducted in or near most camps were and are more relevant, requiring only *brevet* or basic literacy. But these courses have been limited in type (mainly sewing and typing), as well as in level. Their diplomas were sufficient for jobs in resistance offices, but were not recognised by Lebanese employers. Though new vocational courses have been introduced since the 1982 war (including business and office skills, hairdressing, accountancy), very few graduates have found work. This is partly because of the closure of the Lebanese economy to Palesti-

nians, partly because low income levels in camps do not allow the commercial development that generates jobs for Lebanese women.

It would be false to conclude from this, however, that vocational courses are a waste of time. On the contrary, there are many reasons why they should be expanded and developed. Women who work before marriage are more likely to work after, and though this brings strain, it is also a basis of satisfaction, and, in case of widowhood, it gives a woman qualifications to fall back on. Further, many girls leave the camp on marriage, and in the diaspora they are often able to exercise work skills that had no scope at home. Indeed, many show the capacity of "frontier" women to run a home, do a job, and master strange languages, laws and officials. To see camp women as *only* housewives would be to miss their flexibility and adventurousness.

Most Shatila girls will marry a *shabb* (young man) from this camp or another, whose chance of employment or migration is equally restricted. Keeping home in a camp means a daily struggle with dirt from dusty or muddy streets; fetching water from distant street taps; patching up thin walls and leaky roofs; washing clothes every other day for families of eight or more; baking bread in temperatures of 80°F; and coping with the many sicknesses that arise from leaking sewers, street dirt, protein-low diets and poor habitat. This is the daily life of camp housewives in normal times. But since mid-1985 there have been Amal attacks and sieges, leading to a degree of destruction and displacement that makes the hardships of post-'82 invasion days like heaven — Middle East International, London.

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DENTAL FACILITIES FOR SYRIAN CAMPS DEVELOPED

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 19 Feb 87 p 6

[Text] AMMAN (Star) — Even after 36 years, it seems there is still room for invention and ingenuity in finding ways of delivering Unrwa health services to Palestine refugees.

This has been proved in the Syrian Arab Republic, where, in order to get dental health services to three locations in the Damascus area, Unrwa health and transport staff worked together to convert a passenger van for use as a mobile dental clinic.

The idea of a mobile unit had been in the air for some time, but there were no funds available to procure a ready-made one. An old vehicle, used to transport refugee patients to and from hospitals for treatment, had been "surveyed," or written off, and was offered to the Health Department, but there were no funds available to replace it and it couldn't be spared. Another option considered was to use a normal car to bring a dentist to the camps regularly, but this was impractical, as the heavy dental equipment would have had to be loaded and unloaded each time.

Recalls Unrwa's Field Health Officer in Syria, Dr A.S. Toubah: "I found a mini-bus used to transport health staff in the Aleppo area, and a driver who was available after transporting staff to the Damascus Vocational Training Centre early each morning. With funds from the Field Director's reserve, the bus was converted by our own Agency workshop, under the

supervision of Mr Adib Hadba, the vehicle maintenance officer. They went to the local market and purchased materials to make cupboards and install a water tank and basin. The chair and basic dental unit were bought with Agency funds. The sterilizer and instruments came from the Health Department. The workshop took out the seats and put the unit together from scratch."

The unit is now in regular use in three camps in the Damascus area with a total population of 24,000 refugees. People from these camps who needed dental treatment previously had to go on their own to public clinics in Damascus. The Unrwa mobile unit spends two days a week each in Khan Eshieh and Sbeineh camps and one day in Khan Dannoun. Once a week, it goes to schools in the Yarmouk refugee quarter of Damascus to give Unrwa students dental examinations.

The dentist attached to the unit, Dr Su'ad Qasem, is a graduate of Damascus University and previously served for a year at the Unrwa dental clinic in Dera'a camp. Other permanent Unrwa dental units in the Syrian Arab Republic are at the Polyclinic in Damascus (which also serves Jaramana camp), in Yarmouk (also serving) Qabr Essit camps at Neirab camp, Aleppo (also serving Ein Tal and Aleppo town) and Dera'a serving southern Syria.

In the three camps now served by the mobile unit, Dr Qasem does more than the rou-

time treatment — fillings, extractions and cleaning — for which the mobile unit is equipped. Much of her time is spent on instructing refugee mothers and children in basic dental hygiene. "I ask them to bring their own toothbrushes to the clinic and, with the aid of a mirror, I show them how best to use them," she says.

When she carried out a dental health survey of students at the Unrwa Vocational Training Centre (VTC) in Damascus, Dr Qasem found that 47 per cent of them needed dental treatment. The VTC community numbers some 1,000 people (trainees and staff), and Dr Toubah says a way is being sought to get them regular dental attention.

When it is in the camps, the mobile unit parks outside the Unrwa health centre, where it attracts patients on their way to and from the daily mother-and-child health care clinics. The response has been encouraging, said Dr Qasem on one busy day recently at Khan Eshieh camp (population 11,000). A queue of mothers and children waited outside the open side door of the converted car while the dentist examined a young girl and carefully filled in her dental chart. After the girl had finished, her mother climbed into the chair for what Dr Qasem said may have been her first-ever dental examination. "Many of my patients have never been to a dentist before," said the doctor. "At least now we can come to them."

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STATUS OF UNRWA SCHOOLS IN LEBANON REVIEWED

Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 19 Mar 87 p 5

[Text] AMMAN (Star) — For some young Palestine refugees in Lebanon, their schooling this year could be in jeopardy. In the Tyre area, 17 UNRWA schools were closed from the end of September — four months lost; 10 schools in Saida have been occupied by displaced refugees since November — three months lost; and 22 schools at Shatila, Sabra and Burj el Barajneh in Beirut have been closed since November — almost three months lost so far. (Nine schools in the Tyre area reopened early this month but with very low attendance.)

Over the past decade, many children have had long gaps in their schooling because classrooms have been demolished in fighting or were occupied by displaced refugees. And other schools have had to be closed because of the dangerous security situation. In the 1984-85 school year, for example, out of 182 scheduled school days, 47 were lost in Tyre, 54 in Saida and 57 in Beirut.

Unrwa tries to overcome these gaps by extending the school year or starting the next year earlier. But the gaps leave their mark in both performance and desire to continue schooling. Unrwa statistics show that average exam results drop in times of particular turmoil from 84 per cent for example in 1981 to 77 per cent in 1982, the year of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It took another two years to get back to the pre-invasion level.

Palestine refugees have always seen education as their only hope, but even this hope has been tarnished in Lebanon. Because of this desire for education, Unrwa's focus over the years since it began operations in 1950 has changed from relief to education. In 1987 education will take almost two-thirds of the Agency's \$200 million budget. There are some bright spots this school year in Lebanon. The 23 Agency schools in the Tripoli and Beqaa valley areas have been operating normally for most of the 1986-87 school year.

Another casualty of war in Lebanon is the Siblin Training Centre near Saida, Lebanon. It has been effectively closed for the past three years. Since 1982 it has been looted twice, damaged several times during fighting and occupied by local militias. Today Siblin is back in Unrwa's hands but the current security situation in Lebanon prevents it from reopening. Every year the Agency plans to reopen Siblin, depending on security. This year is no exception with Agency officials budgeting for reopening in September with about 450 trainees. The centre has been repaired and equipment is being replaced, so the opening depends mainly on the general security situation in area.

Meanwhile, Unrwa is operating some courses at other locations. Four training courses (business and office practice, public health inspectors, radio and TV mechanics and Ar-

chitectural Draftsman) with 108 students are being conducted at one of Unrwa's schools in Saida. In April 1987, courses in business and office practice and for public health inspectors will begin in Tripoli. A new course (refrigeration and air-conditioning) is planned for the 1987-88 school year when Siblin reopens. In addition, 22 young Palestine refugees from Lebanon are attending Unrwa training centres in Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic and 20 girls have been admitted to the Svelte International School and the YWCA in Beirut under Unrwa sponsorship.

Unrwa also offers university scholarships to eligible refugees. This year 33 students in Lebanon have applied and their cases are being reviewed by the education department. As well, eight young men and women have continuing university scholarships from Unrwa. One fortunate youngster is finishing his high school education at the United World College of the Adriatic near Trieste, Italy. UWC has traditionally offered places for Palestine refugee students at its colleges but the students still have to meet UWC's stringent entrance requirements.

School grants provided

Unrwa provides small school grants for children wishing to continue their education after the 10 years of elementary and junior secondary schooling the Agency offers in Lebanon. And these grants are available to children who live in areas with no Unrwa schools in order to help them attend government

or private schools. Last year, 7,463 students received grants. Recently, many more requests for grants have been coming into the education department. This is especially the case in Saida where 10 Unrwa schools are occupied by displaced refugees and children want to enter local non-Unrwa schools.

Dbayeh camp, north of Beirut, relies totally on Unrwa grants. The camp school has been closed since the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975. Attending local schools is the only way for education. But even with Unrwa grants, some parents are unable to send their children to school because of unemployment and steep inflation in Lebanon. They just don't have the money.

Coping with events

With thousands of refugees displaced during the past four months, Unrwa's education authorities have had to redeploy staff and open new class sections in schools that are operating. In the past, the Agency has had to set up new schools to deal with a shifting refugee population and in Saida in the winter of 1982-83, tents were used as schoolrooms. On the campus of Siblin Training Centre, Unrwa has been running a school for refugees living in the Wadi Zeineh area north of Saida. An extra 2,000 displaced refugees have recently moved into the area and 500 children are requesting admission to the school which already has an enrolment of 861 students. This means a need for more classes and more teachers.

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CSO: 4400/186

BRIEFS

PHOSPHATE, ROCK SALT SALES--Sources at the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth reported yesterday that phosphate sales in the January-November period amounted to 307,951 tons. The same sources added that sales of rock salt during the same period totalled 54,483 tons. [Text] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 20 Jan 87 p 2] 13257

CAMPAIGN AGAINST BEGGING--The Governorate of Damascus is continuing its intensive campaign against begging in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Work and Labor. More than 500 beggars of both sexes were detained last year. They were divided into age groups and sent to the Agency for the Employment of Beggars and the Homeless, Ibn Rushd Institute for the Education of Young Men and Social Education Institute for Young Women. [Text] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 10 Feb 87 p 2] 13257

NEW IMPORT, EXPORT RESTRICTIONS--Damascus--The Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade issued a number of decrees. The first one bans the import of processed or unprocessed marble of all kinds regardless of its source, including the rubble stone that is used by participants at the Damascus International Fair. In another decree the Ministry restricted the export of coke coal through the Petroleum Marketing Branch of the Office of the Prime Minister and by whomever is commissioned by that Branch. Excepted from this order are quantities already authorized for export prior to the issue of this decree. In another decree the Ministry discontinued the export of sweet potato, produced by 'Irwah al-Kharifiyah in both the public and private sectors, effective the date of this decree and until further notice. [Text] [Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 9 Feb 87 p2] 13257/7687

VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS--Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' has received (Jo Do Ha Le) as the new ambassador of Vietnam who handed him a copy of his credentials. [Excerpt] [Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1115 GMT 28 Mar 87 JN] /6091

NEW MALTESE AMBASSADOR--Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' received (John Bontempo) this morning who presented him with a copy of his credentials as Malta's new ambassador to Syria. [Excerpt] [Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1115 GMT 29 Mar 87 JN] /6091

CSO: 4400/183

GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY OPPOSE SOVIET PEACE PROPOSAL

East Burnham ARABIA-THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Mar 87 pp 18-19

[Article by Aslam Abdullah]

[Text]

In February, when Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan was in Moscow listening to his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze on the latest Soviet offer for a settlement in Afghanistan, Yunis Khalis, chairman of the Hizb-e-Islami and one of the leaders of the Islamic Alliance of Afghan Mujahideen, was in London countering the so-called peace initiative started by Kabul on 15 January, when the Najib regime announced a unilateral ceasefire.

Yaqub Khan didn't respond immediately to the Soviet offer, which includes economic aid and the proposal of a pact of non-aggression with India if Pakistan accepts the Soviet terms in the forthcoming proximity talks in Geneva. Yunis Khalis, an Islamic scholar who has been in the battlefields since 1973 when Zahir Shah was overthrown, was forthright in his rejection of the Soviet proposal. "The settlement could come only when the Russians withdraw unconditionally and people are restored the right to choose a government of their liking".

Jihad would fizzle out

Moscow feels that Pakistan is the key to the solution of the Afghan problem. But the mujahideen say that they didn't wait for outside approval to start the jihad nor would they listen to outsiders' advice to stop it. The Soviet offer to Pakistan is based mainly on two assumptions. First, if Pakistan refused to back up the mujahideen the Jihad in Afghan would fizzle out. Second, if the refugees were sent back the mujahideen would lose their *locus standi*. Pakistan's acceptance would give legitimacy to the Kabul regime.

The Soviet Union seems to have applied pressures on Pakistan in the past to force home its point of view. Within Pakistan groups of Soviet supporters have tried to create a feeling of hatred against the refugees. At the same time Russia's most trusted political ally, India, has tried to raise issues disturbing to Pakistan's military circles. Pro-Soviet Indian politicians close to the ruling Congress Party say in their private talks that the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan has been discussed several times between the Indian and Soviet officials.

The new Soviet offer, a complete U turn from the previous position, makes it clear that the Kremlin has realised that neither an anti-refugee campaign nor war threats have succeeded in deterring Pakistan from its support for the mujahideen. The new offer promises to give Pakistan economic aid as well as a guarantee for a peace pact with India, something which has always been high on President Zia's political agenda.

However, Yunis Khalis and the other mujahideen leaders state that the Soviet Union has been applying pressure and playing diplomacy to the wrong people. "We will fight to the last man", is what Yunis Khalis and all mujahideen leaders say.

Even if Pakistan agrees to the Soviet terms in the forthcoming Geneva proximity talks, the situation inside Afghanistan would not change as far as the mujahideen are concerned. Yunis Khalis seems to be confident that the victory would ultimately come to people who have been waging jihad for the last seven years and who have suffered more than a million casualties.

Mujahideen leaders, including Yunis Khalis, believe that the recent peace proposal from Kabul is Soviet propaganda designed to project a soft image of the present ruler. "Nothing has changed since the Najib regime announced a cease fire. The Soviet army inaugurated the first day of the much acclaimed ceasefire by killing eight mujahideen in unprovoked attacks. Not a single day passes without a skirmish or fight between the Mujahideen and the Russian army," asserted Yunis Khalis.

Hollowness exposed

The continuous fighting is not only reported by Yunis Khalis, whose commandos have strong bases in some parts of Afghanistan, but by almost every group engaged in the jihad. On the one hand it exposes the hollowness of the ceasefire, while on the other it proves the mujahideen point that the key to the Afghan problem lies inside the country itself.

Yunis Khalis realises that the mujahideen have to offer a more united resistance and he is confident that in the coming days such a unity could ultimately be achieved. He believes that unity will emerge as a result of trust and confidence among partners. The jihad, he says, has provided the opportunity to experience and express trust and confidence.

Absence of a unified party doesn't mean that the Afghan mujahideen groups are disunited. Yunis Khalis feels that the multiplicity of organisations proves that people tend to work among those whom they know better and who in their view are the most capable ones to lead them.

This was the point which Yunis Khalis tried to highlight during this five day visit to London

at the British government's invitation. During the talks which he held with British officials and politicians, he stated categorically that the fight would go on irrespective of the outcome of the Geneva proximity talks and the absence of a united party. The Islamic Alliance of the Afghan Mujahideen, he argued, is a unified forum.

The new Afghanistan

The other point which he made during his official talks was that no mujahideen group would be allowed to impose itself on the people after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Najib regime. The mujahideen, he said, would accept an independent Islamic Afghanistan. The new Afghanistan would allow its people to choose a system of government of their liking and the party to run it. The communists and the supporters of the present regime would have no place in this Afghanistan. "But if they returned to Islam and admitted their mistakes they would be forgiven", Yunis Khalis promised.

The Russians are working hard on Pakistan primarily to avoid humiliation following a withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan's acceptance of their terms would legitimise their regime, as the document to be signed would have the signature of both Kabul and Islamabad governments.

The Russians certainly don't want to be remembered by their comrades as those who betrayed the children of their revolution in times of difficulty. Moreover they also feel that a government which was unsympathetic to them would be a constant threat to their own political stability in Central Asia.

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CSO: 4600/188

ANALYST REPORTS, COMMENT ON ACCORD WITH PAKISTAN

Madras THE HINDU in English 3 Mar 87 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 2.

An agreement was signed in Islamabad today by India and Pakistan on the second phase of military withdrawals starting with the Kutch sector in the south and then extending northwards to the borders of Rajasthan.

The pull-out of all offensive and defensive formations on either side in the sector south of Barmer-Chhor along the Sind-Gujarat border will be completed within 15 days from today, while the withdrawal of troops to their peacetime locations up to Hindumalkot-Mandi Sadiq Ganj in the north along the Rajasthan border will commence from March 16, more or less coinciding with the completion of Brasstacks exercise.

The agreed minutes of the second round of Indo-Pakistan Secretary-level talks, initialled by the leaders of the two delegations, Mr. Abdul Sattar and Mr. Alfred Gonsalves, did not specify how long the two sides would take to complete the second phase of these military withdrawals along the borders of Rajasthan. But the general assumption was that these would also be completed within a fortnight.

During the first round of talks in Delhi, which concluded on February 4, India and Pakistan agreed to adopt a sector by sector approach for completing these withdrawals, starting with the Ravi-Chenab corridor where the Pakistan army had moved its northern strike force consisting of the 6th Armoured Division and the 17th Infantry Division to forward positions in the Shakargarh bulge, posing a grave threat to Jammu in the north and Gurdaspur in the east.

Crucial withdrawals: The agreement reached today at the conclusion of the second round of talks in Islamabad provided for the next phase of withdrawals commencing at the southern most sector between Sind and Gujarat and then moving northwards to the borders of Rajasthan. It meant that the final phase of the crucial withdrawals in Punjab along Pathankot, Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepore, the most sensitive sector of the Indo-Pakistan border had been kept in abeyance till the third round of Secretary-level talks due to be held at the end of March or in early April.

The implication of the limited accord initialled today was that the southern strike force of the Pakistan army, comprising the 1st Armoured Division and the 37th Infantry Division which crossed the Sutlej and moved forward in mid-January from Rahim Yar Khan to an area close to Abohar-Fazilka on the Indian side would continue to remain at its present location till the conclusion of Operation Brasstacks, when the Indian

armoured and infantry formations engaged in this exercise would start returning to their normal stations.

The much delayed final phase of Operation Brasstacks is due to commence on March 4 and conclude around the middle of the month, when the participating Indian units would start thinning out from the exercise area in southern Rajasthan. As a token of its peaceful intentions, the Government of India is taking a party of foreign military attaches including the one from Pakistan stationed in Delhi, besides Indian and foreign correspondents to witness the final phase of the exercise.

The following is the text of the agreed minutes of consultations between Mr. Abdul Sattar, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and Mr. A. S. Gonsalves, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India held at Islamabad from February 27 to March 2, 1987.

I. The consultations were held in pursuance of para (x) of the Minutes of Consultations initialled in New Delhi on February 4, 1987, for discussion of further concrete measures for de-escalation along the border.

II. It was agreed that:

(a) All defensive and offensive formations in the sector south of Barmer-Chhor will commence return to their peacetime locations which shall be completed within 15 days of the date of signing of these minutes.

(b) In the sector comprising Barmer-Chhor in the south and up to Hindumalkot-Mandi Sadiq Ganj in the north, all defensive and offensive formations will commence return to their peacetime locations from March 16, 1987.

(c) The pull-out of troops will be undertaken in a graduated manner and will be monitored through regular contact to be maintained by the Ds. G. M. O. of both sides.

III. For discussions of further de-escalation measures along the international border, a Pakistan delegation has been invited to visit New Delhi at an early mutually convenient date to be settled through diplomatic channels.

PTI and UNI report from Islamabad.

Today's agreement will cover the pull-out of nearly 70 per cent of the troops. The Indian troops will continue to remain deployed in sensitive Punjab with Pakistan raising no objection to New Delhi's decision to keep the border sealed to prevent illegal trans-border movement of terrorists, smugglers and drug traffickers.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, has expressed satisfaction at the completion of pull-out of troops from the Ravi-Chenab corridor.

A letter to this effect was delivered to the Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Muhammad Khan Junejo by Mr. Gonsalves when the latter called on Mr. Junejo in Islamabad yesterday.

INDIA TO LOBBY IN U.S. AGAINST PAKISTAN BOMB

Madras THE HINDU in English 4 Mar 87 p 9

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 3.

An all-out effort will be made by India during the next few weeks to lobby intensely in U. S. Congressional circles in Washington against the Reagan administration's unabashed bid to turn a blind eye to Pakistan's bomb programme, while seeking approval for the new \$4.2 billion military aid package for it.

Despite their reservations against India for its alleged pro-Soviet inclinations, there are some influential Senators who are opposed to the Pentagon's pro-Pakistan proclivities which continue to colour the U. S. policies towards them.

The U. S. is perhaps the only country in the world where a foreign government can openly campaign in Congressional circles against the actions of the administration without risking a breach of diplomatic relations. The West European democracies, for example, would not tolerate any such attempts by foreign embassies or lobbies to build up parliamentary pressures against the policies of their Governments.

Healthy tradition: The Government of India is determined to take full advantage of this healthy American tradition to carry on a vigorous campaign in Congressional circles against the blatant attempts of President Reagan and his advisers to bypass the Symington amendment and go ahead with the new military aid programme, without making any serious attempt to restrain Pakistan from crossing the nuclear threshold and upsetting the balance of power in the sub-continent. In the prevailing political atmosphere in Washington, it should not be too difficult to make a dent on Congressional opinion with an intelligent campaign backed by hard facts about Pakistan's bomb programme, without attempting to overstate the Indian case or allowing the Soviet factor to adversely affect the congressional attitudes by refraining in the next few weeks from any needlessly controver-

sial pronouncements.

The non-aligned coordination Bureau meeting, which is being held in Guyana next at the Foreign Ministers level, is going to be one such occasion when the U. S. will come in for a lot of bashing for its policies in central America which is expected to be the main theme at this conference. The Indian Foreign Minister, Mr. N. D. Tiwari, cannot afford to adopt an apologetic attitude towards U. S. interference in countries like Nicaragua to avoid causing unnecessary offence to American opinion, but the Indian criticism could be articulated with a greater degree of sophistication by taking advantage of the growing opposition within the U. S. itself against the actions of the Reagan administration.

One of the suggestions under consideration is that the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, should write personally to prominent U. S. Congressional leaders putting the Pak bomb threat in its proper perspective and let them draw their own conclusions about the grave consequences of the Reagan administration's policy of ignoring it. The possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would not only nullify overnight any conventional arms superiority that India might possess as the largest country in South Asia, but also dramatically alter the balance of power in the region throwing the doors wide open for all-out super power rivalries.

The developments of such a situation would, willy-nilly compel India to exercise the nuclear option, but the fact that both India and Pakistan possess the bomb would not by itself help to preserve the balance in such a situation. It needs to be explained to U. S. Congressional leaders with skill and imagination that even the two super powers cannot localise the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan; since China is bound to take sides to sharpen the confrontation, compelling both the U. S. and the Soviet Union to step in to secure their own political and strategic interests.

REPORT ON GANDHI 3 MARCH REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Mar 87 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 3.

THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, today offered to initiate discussions on keeping religion out of politics and considered it "imperative to face the challenge squarely."

He did not want to minimise the nature of the challenge but thought "it was time to put our heads together and concretise the issues." The objective was to prevent religious bodies from interfering in politics and national issues.

Mr. Gandhi pointed out that a minority of communalists, fundamentalists and terrorists were drawing their strength from religion. He sought the co-operation of the opposition in fighting these forces and declared: "We welcome any suggestion from you provided it is constructive."

He reminded the Lok Sabha that such a collective or consensus approach had wholesome results as was evident in Punjab where all parties had joined in supporting the struggle against terrorism.

Replying to the debate on the President's address, he vigorously defended the accords on Punjab, Assam and Mizoram which, in his view, helped strengthen the democratic forces. He reaffirmed the urgency to introduce new techniques and technology to suit the country's present-day needs without abandoning the basic economic philosophy.

Towards the close of his hour-long address, he referred to the country's foreign policy and said that those who had the responsibility and the means to halt Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme had not only failed to do so but had helped that country to launch

an ambitious armaments programme.

To cheers from his party members, he declared: "Let there be no mistake about India's determination and capacity to defend its sovereignty and integrity."

Mr. Gandhi did not miss the occasion to taunt the opposition: "They had little to find fault in the President's address. Some of them believe in discords, while we believe in accords."

"India's policy is not what it was in 1979, then nobody listened to us. Now the world is listening to us and looking to India for her lead."

He reiterated the government's support to the Barmala government and remarked that with "all of us working together the government stand is vindicated." At the outset he cautioned against decrying the accords in Assam, Punjab and Mizoram and was categorical: "We are not blocking anything."

When Mr. Dinesh Goswami persisted in questioning the claim that the Centre had cleared all issues, the Prime Minister clarified that his government acted in a manner that was in the interests of Assam and the nation. He acknowledged that there were problems in implementing some points of the accord but a country as large and diverse as India could only be run by consensus.

But he made it clear: "We will not deviate from what is written in the accord. At the same time we will not allow anything that will endanger or threaten national unity."

On the state of the economy he maintained that it was buoyant as a result of the innovations of the past few years. There was no question of deviating from the goals set by Nehru and Indira Gandhi. He quoted Nehru to say that socialism did not mean distribution of poverty but generation of wealth through productivity. He expressed satisfaction that industrial growth had exceeded eight per cent a year in the last three years. It was the

highest in 20 years, he said.

He spoke at length on the anti-poverty programme and explained that education was a major instrument in fighting poverty. He scoffed at suggestions that the new education policy had an elitist bias. On the other hand, the new policy would reach the vast bulk of the rural poor.

He said the government attached great importance to anti-poverty programmes. The allocation for rural development in 1987-88 was Rs. 2,000 crores. In 1986-87 and 1987-88, the allocation for rural development would exceed the total allocation to this sector in the sixth plan.

On foreign relations he said India could not be content with looking inwards as its independence was linked to strengthening the independence of all other nations. World economy was still affected by imperialism and colonialism. India would continue to take the lead in meeting these challenges.

He welcomed the latest proposals by the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachov, on Euromissiles and referred to India's initiative on disarmament.

He said that apart from problems with Pakistan, India had categorically told Sri Lanka that there could be no solution to the ethnic crisis through violence. "As long as this violence continues against Tamils we find it difficult to continue the process of mediation."

After his speech, the house adopted a motion of thanks to the President for his address.

PTI adds: In the Rajya Sabha many ruling party members urged the government to review its nuclear policy in view of the reports about a Pakistan bomb.

The Prime Minister is scheduled to intervene in the debate tomorrow.

The opposition members said the President's address contained little which they could appreciate.

GANDHI REMARKS SEEN AS TRY TO RESUME TALKS WITH PRC

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Mar 87

[Article by Subhash Chakrakarti]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, March 3.

THE Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's brief reference in carefully chosen words on Sino-Indian relations is seen as a meaningful message to China to resume talks for a negotiated settlement of the border dispute.

Mr. Gandhi is known to have held wide consultations with his aides before finalising the latest Indian formulation on Sino-Indian relations. There have of late been a great deal of exchanges between the Prime Minister's secretariat and the external affairs ministry on developing a new strategy for attempting to improve India's relations with China.

The appointment of Mr. K. P. S. Menon as foreign secretary, who till recently served as India's ambassador to China, is a compliment to the current exercise to review the China policy or rather, as cynics would put it, the lack of it.

Indications are that Mr. Gandhi would like the external affairs minister, Mr. N. D. Tiwari, to take an early initiative to resume official-level bilateral talks. Political level negotiations at an appropriate level can be said to be on the anvil.

India's increasing frustration to improve relations with Pakistan and a distinct surge in Sino-Soviet relations have brought about a new situation. There is an increasing feeling among policy planners that the objective reali-

ty of the situation makes it incumbent upon India to search for a fresh approach to Sino-Indian relations.

According to competent sources, Mr. Gandhi's latest statement marks the beginning of this exercise. Mr. Gandhi told the Lok Sabha: "There has been tension on our border with China. We want a peaceful settlement of the border issue. It will need patience. It will need restraint. It will need wisdom and statesmanship. We are two ancient civilisations. It is this perspective that should guide our two countries in seeking a solution of the problem".

Mr. Gandhi made personal acquaintance of the Chinese premier, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, when they met in New York in 1985 during the 40th founding anniversary of the United Nations.

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CSO: 4600/1518

NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER, PREMIER MEET PRESS

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 4 Mar 87 p 1

[Text]

The Netherlands, whose stolen nuclear centrifuge designs helped Pakistan embark upon the clandestine nuclear bomb programme, has sought to dissuade India from response measures on the plea that it would negate the concept of nuclear non-proliferation.

"It will set back everything" that India has done over the years to check spread and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, Dutch Foreign Minister H Van Den Broek told a press conference addressed jointly with Premier R F M Lubbers Tuesday evening.

Mr Broek evaded a question about "inadvertent Dutch involvement in Pakistan's nuclear bomb programme", and said he would refrain from anything that was entirely between India and Pakistan. However, the Netherlands would continue to support India's principled stand for nuclear non-proliferation.

Any measures that would be in response to Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme would set back everything done so far, for nuclear non-proliferation, he said, adding "we should try to promote the NPT".

Asked about the possibility of cooperation between India and the Netherlands in the nuclear fields, for peaceful purposes, Mr Broek sought to suggest that this was possible only if India joined the NPT. "Whatever has to be done, must be done under strict international supervision and controls", he said, pointing out that the

Netherlands was a member of the London Club and a signatory to Vienna conventions.

Premier Lubbers, did not intervene in the discussion on the sensitive issue, but projected to newsmen a relationship of warmth, mutual understanding and on-going economic cooperation between India and his country.

He announced a long-term development grant of Rs 550 crore for India's water transport and shipping industry, and another Rs 75 crore for the implementation of poverty-alleviation programme, including drinking water and environment protection.

The first Dutch Premier to visit India, soon after Queen Beatrix did last

year, Mr Lubbers said the Rs 550-crore grant would be used for dredging Indian rivers to make them navigable, modernisation of vessel survey work, training and management. Part of the funds would be used for clearing the backlog of dredging operations in ports.

Communications, agriculture, flood control, food processing, rural credits, irrigation facilities, fertilizers were some areas which Mr Lubbers mentioned that would get the Dutch assistance.

In the context of expanding Indo-Dutch economic cooperation, the visiting Premier also assured that his country would try to find access to the

European Community for more Indian exports as well as liberalise imports from India. Though the items had not yet been identified, he thought Indian textiles could make a dent in the Dutch and European Community markets.

Mr Lubbers, who during his two-day stay in the Capital met President Zail Singh, Vice-President R Venkataraman and held talks with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, said his country had collaborative agreements with private companies and would like to expand the exchanges.

He told newsmen that besides economic cooperation, he had discussed with Mr Gandhi political, regional and international issues. The "good partnership" with India was reflected in common perceptions of several global issues, including apartheid in South Africa.

Foreign Minister Broek while stating that the Netherlands was one with India in demanding an early end to the apartheid, said his country however, was trying to "create a political forum" which would bring various parties in South Africa together in a "national reconciliation" to meet the challenges of post-apartheid period.

Giving details of the economic sanctions, the European Community had decided against South Africa at the Dutch initiative, Mr Broek told newsmen that his country had committed 500 million guilders for the anti-apartheid struggle and the Frontline States.

INFILTRATION, DRUG, ARMS SMUGGLING IN KUTCH AREA EXAMINED

Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 25-31 Jan 87 pp 34-39

[Report by Vishnu Pandya]

[Text] Whenever I think of the problems of the country's border areas, the novel "All Quiet on the Western Front" comes to mind.

In this book, the writer makes the point that wars will never stop, that despite cease-fires wars continue, and that we delude ourselves with cease-fires.

When I visited the Assam-Bangladesh border, when we approached the blood-soaked border of Punjab, and when I happened to visit Arunachal, I sensed that the border areas have to wage war every day. It is true that for this kind of war one does not need soldiers in trenches firing at each other. The means of war are many. Smuggling goes on. Illegal arms keep coming in. Drug trafficking and infiltration continue. Foreigners too become citizens and voters. Spying and who knows what else goes on in the border areas. One does not learn these things from newspapers or parliamentary reports.

The conditions on the Gujarat India-Pakistan border are no different. It is easy to travel abroad illegally from the sea and land border of three districts, Kutch, Banaskantha and Jamnagar. Several routes are used for crossing; smuggling occurs on a large scale, as well as infiltration and espionage. Sometimes one wonders if the conditions on these borders are about to become like those of Assam.

Let us start this sad story with Kutch. The Rann of Kutch extends over 26,139 square kilometers. The entire Kutch area covers 45,612 kilometers. The Rann constitutes 54 percent of the area. In the Rann there are small and big mountains. A little distance from Khawda (the last habitation on the border) are the "Black Hills of Kutch." In Vagad there is Kanthkot and in the middle there is Chhenodhar mountain, but the streams Kankawati, Nagmati, Chandyatra, Luni and Khari, are not perennial, and Kutch suffers a famine every 3 years.

People manage to live even in these meager conditions. According to the 1981 census, 775,789 people lived in the area's tiny villages. The city population is 274,372. Seventy-three villages have been deserted. The language of the people is Kutchi; it has no script, but it has 100,000 words.

The history of Kutch is one of a prosperous life amid victories and defeats. There were countless foreign invasions, but the common man maintained his identity. There is 200-mile-long sea border. Earlier, international trade was conducted from Mandvi and Lakhpat. A shipbuilding industry was established. According to botanist Bhagwanlai Inderji, the Sindh River once flowed through this area, there were forests containing 1,000 varieties of plants, and 159 kinds of birds flourished there.

But today it is all deserted. We visited Lakhpat on the western coast. The town is surrounded by strong walls and huge gates. There is the vast sea, but everything has a deserted look. There is no life, no market and no means of livelihood. People have locked their homes and left in search of livelihood. Hardly 200-300 persons remain. There is a Sikh temple, too. Guru Nanak came here in the course of his pilgrimage. For him, this was just one corner of united India, but is Kutch mentioned on the Khalistan map because Guru Nanak once came here?

From Lakhpat one can see several decayed towns. Close to the sea border is the last port, Koteswar. There is one temple, almost embracing the sea. All the signs of Alauddin Khilji's invasion still remain.

Traces of the 5,000-year-old Harappa civilization have been found in Kutch. King Darius of Persia ruled over this area about 500 BC, and memories of Salukes, Vikramaditya and Tudradaman are associated with Kutch. Mahmud Ghazanavi passed this way after his sack of Somnath. The Chinese traveller Huan Suang narrated that near Narayan Sarovar [Narayan Lake] there were 40 Buddhist monasteries and that 5,000 Mahayanis used to pray there. On Pachmai Pir mountain near Khawda are the [mythic] footprints of Duttatreya. From there one can see the vast Rann spread like a white sheet. On the border are small Pakistani villages.

And when did Kabir's community come to Kutch? The backward class of this area worship the god Jakh. The Jakhs were once demigods. They came from Iran, and they fought against the king on behalf of the common man. The port of Jakhau is named after them.

The cattlemen of Bannai are experts in handicrafts. Modern women in Delhi and Bombay are fond of saris from Kutch. Fine silver ornaments are made here. Countless handicrafts are available in the bazaars of Bhuj. But this is not the real Kutch. The reality is very different. Let us consider some aspects that will take us to the reality. The first question is, where does infiltration take place.

There are nearly 14 routes through which one can go to Pakistan. It is possible to reach Pakistan's Alibunder and Rahim Ka Bazaar (before independence it was known as Ram Ka Bazaar) from the village of Luna in the Bunni area. Similarly, one can reach Badin Tamnis. By taking the passage between Bhirandyara and Banni, one can approach Salserda, from Belawat to Nagarparkar and from Lakhpat by sea to Karachi (from Lakhpat to Karachi, the distance is 120 miles). From Hajipur it is possible to reach Rahim Ka Bazaar (15 miles away) via Sumrasar Bhirandyara to Western Dharamshala, via Kanjarkot to Badin.

From Lohani in Vagad one can easily reach Nagarparkar in Pakistan 20 miles away. There are routes to Pakistan from Sushgam in the Banaskantha area. Some of these routes pass through the Rann while others are by sea.

One cannot take these routes unless one is familiar with the terrain. In 1969 we went to the Nagarparkar area (Pakistan) which had been captured by India. We found the way covered with a layer of salt. We did not know that the sun would make the ground hot suddenly and that it would be difficult for us to move forward. No sooner did our feet touch the ground than the surface layer of salt would break, and underneath there would be boiling salt water. The pieces of salt would cause the feet to start bleeding, and when the hot salt water came in contact with the wounds, the pain was sharp. In this wounded condition, running 5-7 kilometers at high noon made one feel that death was not far off. The camel travels easily in this terrain. This is called ladder service.

Not all of these routes are currently in use. The route to Western Dharamshala Badin via Sumrasar Bhirandyara was in use until 1965. Today there are border security force posts there. This route further down leads to another route. The same route beyond Solserda takes one to the Pakistani village of Baliyari.

Prior to India's partition, there were family ties between Kutch and Sind in Pakistan. On the two sides of the border people are related, but legal movement is very difficult. Even after obtaining a visa and a passport, the only way is through the Wagha border in Punjab. How can a poor man afford such an expense? There is a regular business of transporting people easily by camel under cover of darkness at a fee of 50-100 rupees. A bridegroom is transported at night, the marriage ceremony is held in the morning, and the bride is brought back.

But the dangerous purpose of the illegal movement is infiltration and smuggling. These operations are carried on in Kutch across the land and sea borders. Both the 320-kilometer-long land border and the 340-kilometer sea border are used for this purpose.

Here are details of a few incidents.

On 29 May 1985, a Pakistani flag was found in a confiscated boat. This was later unfurled over the Savalapur durgah.

Jalaluddin Saiduddin Khan was captured in Shekhav, Ahmedabad. His father was a member of the national assembly during the Bhutto regime.

On 9 August 1984, during the night a tempo [a kind of automobile] was seized near Gathuli. It was being used to transport Pakistani citizens to and from Pakistan.

On 27 January 1984, police officials seized a boat with 13 fishermen at a small island in Kori Creek. All of the people in the boat were Pakistani citizens. On the same spot on 14 October 1985, 22 Pakistani nationals were caught in a Pakistani trailer, including 15 who had come from Bangladesh. The fishermen said that two Karachi trailers, Al Ismael and Al Adad, were repeatedly used for

this purpose. In fact, only 2 out of 27 trailers were seized. The rest got away. On 29 March 1985, six infiltrators who had sneaked in by sea near Koteswar were captured. Similarly, on 24 October 1985 on the same spot, a Pakistani boat and a launch were seized, but 9 of the 11 Pakistanis travelling in them succeeded in escaping. The two whom police took in custody said that they were from the Pakistani village of Haidari. Police investigation revealed that they were Kutch residents. Two residents of Mota Mitara village near Khawda were arrested while returning from Pakistan. Similarly, 15 Pakistanis were arrested in the port of Jakhau on 9 October. On 20 January 1985, people travelling from Bangladesh to Pakistan were caught near Hajipur.

The question is, are these infiltrators put on trial? Yes, they are. The police file a complaint in a court of law. But I have been told by some police officials that there are several difficulties in establishing that the entry and citizenship are illegal. These people obtain ration cards, they become voters, they buy land. How can an ordinary police constable marshal evidence against them? The result is that the court finds them innocent and sets them free, or they complete a minor jail term and once again engage in the same business.

On 9 April 1985, following a trial at a court in Bhuj, four infiltrators were sentenced. One was sentenced to 3 months in jail and fined 500 rupees, and the rest were released. Among those sentenced was Ishaq Omar, for whom this was not the first sentence. He had been caught before, and had spent time in jail. After release from jail, he again started moving to and from Pakistan. He carried Pakistani identification.

When police raided a tiny village near Lakhpat in December 1986, they recovered heroin worth 1.4 million rupees. The owner of the heroin was also there. At first, he described himself as Abdullah Ishaq, but then he gave his name as Mohammad Haji Qasim. Later police learned that this was the notorious India-Pakistan border smuggler known as "Sumar Botal." He confessed this to the district police chief, Kuldeep Sharma. He was a friend of Pakistani Minister Pirzada. Ibrahim Buffoon, a smuggler working with him, was also caught. From him were recovered electronic equipment for use in spying and other documents. Ibrahim was a patron of several social agencies of Kutch. In 1975-76 he fled, but later he came back.

In another incident, Latif, a taxi driver on contract to Akashwani, got into a fight with another person. Abdul Hamid Abdullah, who was arrested as a result of the fight, admitted that he was a Pakistani informer. There is another complication, and this concerns double agents. Some of our agencies proceed on the assumption that the Pakistani informer is our man, but later it is learned that in fact he has been working for Pakistan. Near Hajipur lived a communal leader named Pir Ghaus Mohammad. He settled permanently near Nakhtana. People began to respect him as a Pir. His father was known here. He bought land, and during the 1980 elections he was a voter. When local residents complained, the police investigated. In 1982, it was decided that because he was clearly a Pakistani national, he should be sent to Pakistan. But he continued to work as a double agent, and despite being a Pakistani national and a spy, he remained here until October 1985. If the police officer had not taken a tough stand, who knows how long he would have stayed in Kutch.

On 5 November 1985, the chairman of Lakhpat Panchayat referred another such case to the police. The police made an arrest, but except for banishment, no action was taken against him. He continued to travel to and from Pakistan. Jumawali Mamad gave shelter to a Pakistani named Omar Dagra who conveyed to Pakistan information about the equipment on the Indian Navy trainer ship Valsura. The police have no accurate idea of the number of people coming to India from Pakistan. Sometimes the government says that except for the 1965 India-Pakistan war refugees, there has been no infiltration. This is completely untrue. In 1965, 10,786 Muslims left Kutch for Pakistan. According to the government, only 1,010 of them have returned. Are these figures accurate? People in large numbers have come back and settled as before.

Now it appears that people are determined to take a stand against infiltration. They have become aware. Recently I visited the small town of Dhayapar. The brave youth of this area have formed an organization called the "Sardar Patel Youth Society." These youth go to neighboring villages and gather information about illegal settlers. On 6 November 1985 these youth gave the police a memorandum containing the names of people who had settled illegally in Kutch. The youth complain that despite the proof, the police have not taken action. What happened was that the Muslim young man who had fearlessly found out about the illegal settlers was threatened with death. Kirti Khatri, the editor of the local newspaper, KUTCH MITRA told me of another incident. In 1984 the ONGC [Oil and Natural Gas Commission] was looking for undersea petroleum deposits. While this was going on, Pakistani Navy men arrived in the guise of fishermen and came up to the ONGC rig.

Apart from smuggling and spying, these border villages of Kutch face another problem, and that is that the population of these villages has been increasing unabated. Conditions precisely like those of Assam are appearing here. Some of the villages are definitely populated by refugees returning from Pakistan, while in some 10 villages the population has been rising by leaps and bounds. Let us take the example of Lakhpat tehsil. The villages there are dispersed; some are right on the sea coast. During the years 1961 to 1971 and 1971 to 1981, the population here increased by 50-700 percent. These are small villages. In some places the border villages are comprised of only 10-15 families. Under these conditions, such a rapid rise in the population in these border areas denotes danger.

These villages are Sher, Guneri, Malda, Phulra, Dimsar, Julachaye, Lakrhi Gugriana, Asalaki, Mori, Pipar, Jadava, Samajiwaro, Khirsara, Khogarpur, Koriani, Akari, Goghadhad, Ameeya, Chakriya and Pipar, etc.

In Rapar tehsil, there are also such villages. They are Rabariwar, Garhda, Nagalpur, Manjuwas, Thanpur, Vanani, Narampur, Palanpur, Kharakuva, Govindpur, Phulpara, Adesar, Samanivad, Ramsar, Sarsava, Badalpur, Jethasari, Pratapgarh, etc.

Similar conditions exist in the Khawda area. Small villages dot the route from Bhuj to Khawda. Beyond Khawda is Kala Dungar. During March-April, the Arabian Sea water from Kori Nal and Kachhi Mushir waters from Injpal flood this area. Then one encounters sea-like conditions in the Rann. In December the

salty water dries up and this forms the upper surface. Beyond this are the border and outposts. Allabandh, Dharbanni, Chhar Bet, Bawarla Bet, Mori Bet, Bhajhro Bet, Trangdi Bet (Bet means island) are located in this part of the Rann. Here posts of Indian and Pakistani border security forces guard the border.

In the 224-square-mile area there are only 15 villages. On the way to Khawada, there is Bhirandyara. Here there are only 25-30 houses within a 3-kilometer area. There is one school, and it opens only if the teacher shows up. The villages Kuran, Dinara, Ghoshna, Kunriya, Luna, etc., are located here. In Dinara, my friend, Kantisen Sharaf, is promoting handicrafts and art created by illiterate women.

Now let us see what the statistics say about infiltration. In 1980, the number was 24; in 1981, it was 36; in 1983, again 24; in 1984, it was 97; and by November of 1985, foreigners had infiltrated. Almost all of them was sent back to Pakistan. Did these people stay here long? What happened to the infiltrators who because of their frequent visits acquired permanent residence?

In 1986 when I visited Kutch, I met many prominent citizens. Police officials said that between January and March 1986, as many as 62 persons were caught living illegally in the Lakhpatt-Khawda area. They told me that in Jumra village in the Jara hill area, 40 persons were caught. They all had acquired land and ration cards and thus had become voters.

On 6 December 1985, the internal security minister, Arun Nehru, told Lok Sabha that there was no information as to where 5,513 Pakistani infiltrators had settled. Of the 9,122 Pakistani nationals who settled illegally, 450 are in Gujrat. The census indicates that the population of Kutch increased by 24 percent, but the rate of increase in 10 border villages was 50-700 percent. The question arises, what is the principal occupation of the majority of these people. The principal occupation is cattle raising, and to a very small extent, farming. But this place is a haven for smuggling. Silver ornaments, arms, and drugs are smuggled in here on a large scale. The big smugglers use carriers for this purpose. Because of the lack of coordination among customs, police, the border security force and other agencies, smuggling goes on.

The smuggling of "brown sugar" is the most dangerous. Charas, ganja and heroin are also smuggled in. Beyond Gujarat, brown sugar is taken as far as Bombay and Delhi. For this trafficking, big and small mafia groups have been formed. When the time is opportune, these gangs also take part in riots. These mafia gangs were active during the 1985 Ahmedabad riots. They had the protection of politicians. Ahmedabad has become a center for the distribution of drugs. The smuggled material comes to Ahmedabad from Kutch-Rajasthan. From there, it is taken to various places. Such a mafia gangster from Bombay, Alamzeb, was shot dead by police in Surat. Another person, Latif, is on trial in Ahmedabad.

The large-scale smuggling of brown sugar into India raises the question of whether an international conspiracy exists, and whether following their self-interest, the smugglers have become the tool of this conspiracy. In this

manner, the imperialist countries have ruined the youth of many a country by making them addicted to drugs. Are they hatching a similar conspiracy in India? Afghanistan is the main center for drugs. According to a survey conducted in Bombay, 30 percent of the young men and women of Bombay use brown sugar, and this addiction has ruined them.

In November 1983, 16 kilograms of heroin was seized in Kutch. Also in November a cache of heroin was recovered in Sumar Botal. In May 1985, 130 kilograms of charas and in July, 100 kilograms of charas was recovered in Khawda. Two hundred fifty kilograms of charas seized in Jahra-Jumra, Lakhpat, belonged to the Pakistani international smuggler, Badshah Khan. In October 1986, brown sugar was recovered that had been smuggled across the Kutch border.

The story of illegal arms is similar. Revolvers, rifles and explosive bombs are smuggled in. The coastal areas of Kutch and Jamnagar are well known for this smuggling. The Jamnagar police chief told me that in 1985, 512 illegal arms were seized, all of foreign origin. In April 1984 arms were recovered in Maghapur, Kutch, and in March 1986, 147,000 kilograms of charas was recovered in the same place.

Many herds of cattle are taken out of India across the India-Pakistan border. The number of head of cattle leaving Banas-Kantha and Kutch is substantial. This is because the specter of famine appears there repeatedly. Because of scarcity conditions, the peasants cannot bear the cost of raising cattle, so they sell them. The government has given permission for cattle to be taken out of Jamnagar district by sea. From there, good-quality cattle are taken to the Arab countries. In Okha-Dwarka, a satyagraha was staged to protest such export of cattle. During the most recent famine, 60 percent of the cattle of this area were sent to the slaughterhouse.

Communal forces, too, take advantage of the poverty in the border areas. It has happened to the forest-dwelling indigenous people in the east. And it is true in Kutch. These agencies do their work through various trusts. There have been some cases of conversions, too. In Gorewali village in the Banni area, there was a case of community conversions. The operation of foreign-aided trusts in Kutch is a worrisome development. They disguise their activities under the name of economic and social change, but their aim is something very different.

It appears that terrorists have not made use of this border so far. But such a possibility cannot be ruled out. The disappearance of Jinda from Ahmedabad indicates the connection of terrorists with Gujarat. During "Operation Bluestar," 25 Bangladeshis were captured in the Golden Temple. Bangladeshis have been caught infiltrating across the Kutch border as well. Six such persons were arrested in Khamaliya, near the Saurashtra sea border. The police think that these people were terrorists.

It is clear from these incidents that we should be on the alert on the western border. Some useful suggestions can be offered as to how to resolve these problems. First, more money should be spent on economic progress in the border areas. The shadow of recurring famine hangs over Kutch. People

die because drinking water is not available. When we went to Khawda, a glass of water there was selling for 1 rupee. There are many villages where there are no facilities for water. In Banaskantha, there is acute poverty. This problem should be solved by devising a specific master plan.

From the standpoint of security, a great deal remains to be done. During the 1948 Junagarh liberation movement, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel cautioned us to be on the alert on the Kutch border. In the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the first attack was on Kutch. In this war, the plane of the chief minister, Balwant Rai Mehta, was downed by the Pakistani military. Balwant Rai could not escape. In the India-Pakistan war, Pakistani planes dropped bombs on Okha, Dwarka and Jamnagar.

In accordance with international agreements, the Pakistani areas captured during the 1965 war had to be returned to Pakistan. Because of this decision, we also lost Kanjarkot and Chhar Bet. In those days the opposition leaders staged a satyagraha on the Kutch border. For the duration of the satyagraha, barrister Nathpai, N.G. Ranga, Atal Bihari Vajpai, Madhu Limay, Bhai Kaka, etc., camped in Kutch. During the mutual exchange of captured areas in 1969, I had an opportunity to travel via Banaskantha to the other side of the area captured by our soldiers from Pakistan. With a view to security, the number of border security force posts should be increased and they should be furnished with all available facilities. Guarding the coast is a must along the 360-kilometer-long sea coast. Along the sea coast and land border, it is necessary to have extensive patrolling. We should also have centralized units for security of the sea coasts.

Is it not possible to settle families of retired soldiers on these borders? After 1965, 1,000 people were settled here, but local politics and smuggling together made their life difficult, and consequently they left.

The citizens of the border areas should be issued identification papers. In 1965 [as published] the Gujarat government announced that the citizens would be issued such papers, but a year later, no action has been taken on the announcement.

From the point of view of security, it is necessary to return foreign citizens who have settled illegally. If this is not done, another Assam could be in the making. The government should undertake a special campaign to expel all foreigners who entered after 1965. The election commission should also co-operate in this campaign.

The government should introduce an ordinance to discourage conversions. On the other hand, social service agencies will have to work hard to keep cultural identities pure and intact.

These are some steps on which action could be taken immediately. And this should be done. Following the committee report, the chief minister, Amar Singh Chaudhary, told the Gujarat assembly that his government had proposed to the Center a security strip along the Kutch border. The former internal security minister, Arun Nehru, also visited the Kutch border.

The question is, what is the true test of alertness on the border? In my view, this involves not only the creation of better security conditions by the state government and the center but also increased awareness about the society and life there--in other words, activities that will lead to the economic, social and cultural progress of the border people. Only by facing invasions in every guise and at every level can we truly demonstrate civic and national consciousness.

12286/12859

CSO: 4624/2

ANALYST STRESSES NECESSITY OF ARMY EXERCISES

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Mar 87 pp 1, 9

[Text]

EVERY year NATO and Warsaw Pact forces conduct regular exercises in West Germany and East Germany and Poland respectively. The U.S. flies its airborne forces from long distance for exercises in Egypt. Pakistan conducts naval and air exercises with U.S. forces within the central command framework. Large-scale naval exercises involving hundreds of ships are regular annual features in the Mediterranean, Northern Atlantic and northern Pacific. A few years ago the Chinese conducted large-scale army exercises involving simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Even in this country, there was a combined air exercise in 1964 involving the air forces of U.S. and the Commonwealth. None of these exercises caused any alarms and excursions of the kind associated with "Brasstacks" in Rajasthan.

Exercises are at the heart of professionalism of an armed force. The German army acquired its high professional competence because it used to exercise annually. During his days Emperor Kaiser himself used to attend the exercises. Between the two world wars the German officer corps and the non-commissioned officers converted the army to a defence university and constantly carried out exercises. Out of them came the doctrines of 'blitzkrieg', the mobile tank warfare and pincer movement.

Today NATO boasts of its superior training and better organisational and logistical skills evolved out of the annual 'reformer' exercises. The Soviet forces too carry out gigantic annual exercises not only in central Europe but also in the European Russian plains under the immediate supervision of their defence minister. When Marshal Ustinov visited Delhi he screened during the official reception films of the exercises he had conducted.

In 1947 when India became free we

had only Brigadier-level Indian officers in the army. While the jawans and the junior commissioned officers had a fighting tradition going back to the early days of the East India Company, at the level of officers the Indian army was a very young one in 1947 as hardly 28 years had passed since the commissioning of the first Indian officer. The Indian army expanded modestly in the fifties when officers were promoted somewhat more rapidly than they have been since. The Indian army inherited the traditions and doctrines of the British army which, unlike the Continental armies, especially the German and the Russian, was not known for its skills and doctrines in wars of manoeuvre.

In 1947-48 the Indian army could tackle effectively the Pakistan army in Jammu and Kashmir. In the Hyderabad and Goa operations, it did not face any significant opposition. Being psychologically unprepared to fight a war in mountainous terrain with a large-sized force, a whole division just dissolved in Kameng in 1962. In 1965, again faced with Pakistan, the Indian army stood up to superior American equipment in the opponent's hands and frustrated the Pakistani offensive. In 1971 while the Indian army displayed a high degree of professionalism in the East, on the western front it was mostly a slogging match with very marginal shifts in the frontline except in the Sind area.

Since 1971 the Indian army has been undergoing a radical transformation with continuous absorption of new equipment. The present officer corps spends more time in the junior and middle levels compared to its predecessors in the fifties, gets more intensively trained in staff and command postings, handles far more sophisticated equipment and is used to modern command, control communication and intelligence infrastructure. All the modern combat and combat support equipment now being inducted into the army have to be integrated with tactical

and doctrinal concepts to be evolved within our own armed force.

While selected army officers are sent to training institutions abroad to familiarise them with their doctrines, ultimately the combat doctrines have to be indigenously evolved taking into account the terrain, climate, logistics, the nature of the adversary, his equipment and his combat doctrines.

Just as on the R and D side the country is getting into a stage when equipment will be indigenously designed, our forces have moved to a level of professionalism when they are in a position to evolve their own combat doctrines and organisations. This is the central purpose of military exercises. They are costly but absolutely essential if the enormous expenditure incurred on the equipment and manpower is to be made cost-effective.

With the increasing lethality of the equipment, their augmented manoeuvrability, growth in the rate of fire power and super-imposition of electronic, counter-electronic and sophisticated surveillance capabilities, the handling of a division or corps today is a very different and highly more complicated task than what it was even a decade ago.

India obtains its equipment from different sources and also produces a considerable proportion on its own. These have to be integrated into efficient combat units at various formation levels. The army aviation corps is a recent introduction. The infantry combat vehicle too is a relatively new concept for most on the forces in the world. Increasingly the need for effective tactical coordination of the army and air force to an extent that they fight an integrated battle is gaining acceptance. All these kinds of equipment have to function within a framework of electromagnetic compatibility without jamming each other. Exercises not only help our forces to sort out various problems, provide our fighting forces effective operational doctrines and give them increased self-confidence, but they also send out messages to the rest of the world regarding the level of the competence of our forces — a major factor in discussion of potential adversaries.

While annual exercises are conducted at lower levels of formations, corps-level exercises being costly are conducted on a triennial basis. Exercises, if they are to be realistic, are to be conducted in the type of terrain where potential hostilities are likely to

take place and they require space where large forces can manoeuvre. Since such large-scale exercises disturb the normal life of the area and the population it is necessary to conduct them in less densely-populated areas. All these considerations dictate that the exercise be conducted in Rajasthan.

A realistic corps-level exercise with two sides operating against each other requires not less than six divisions. The "Brasstacks" exercise is not significantly larger than that. The exaggerated versions put out that India has deployed 20 divisions or even 11 divisions stand self-exposed since India cannot concentrate such a large force in Rajasthan without taking the risk of thinning out dangerously its defences elsewhere. It is not difficult to distinguish between the exercise as a feint for a proposed attack and one restricted to a localised area with hundreds of miles of the rest of the border not being put on raised alert. The much-talked-about Egyptian feint against Israel in October 1973 was launched against a front less than eighty miles wide and against a country with which Egypt was in an active state of hostilities. Neither of the two considerations apply to our case.

The Pakistani attempt at controlled confrontation is an attempt to thwart an essential aspect of training and professionalisation of the Indian army. Pakistanis have sought to cover this purpose with proposals for mutual monitoring of exercises as have been agreed upon in Europe at the Stockholm conference. This has confused many observers abroad and in India as well. It is therefore necessary to understand what the essential prerequisites are for India and Pakistan to adopt the kind of rules that have made it possible for the two sides in Europe to agree on mutual confidence-building measures.

The beginning in Europe came about with Bonn's policy of Ostpolitik which resulted in expanded trade between West and Eastern Europe. In the sub-continent expansion of trade has been continuously thwarted — not by India. Secondly, confidence-building in Europe rests on the foundation of the Helsinki declaration which accepts the existing boundaries and forbids the use of force to alter these. Pakistan does not accept that the Kashmir line of control is not to be altered by force. Thirdly, in the European context exercises with high concentration of forces on either side is normally ruled out because of the nuclear factor.

BASRA'S OCCUPATION VIEWED AS TURNING POINT

East Burnham ARABIA-THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Mar 87 p 25

[Text]

Operations Kerbala 4.5 and 6 at the beginning of 1987 fell short of being the "big" offensive often announced by Iran at various times in the past few years as being imminent in its six-year-long war with Iraq. Each time Iran launched an operation against the Iraqis, the Tehran authorities remained ambiguous as to whether or not it was going to be the major offensive. All the previous attacks achieved only meagre successes each time and left tens of thousands of casualties. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini is reported to have said that the "final" one will take place before the end of the Iranian year, that is 21 March 1987. As a result, observers think that the Iranians will attempt a further offensive in March in the rainy season.

For several years Iran has had the initiative in this bloody war and has kept up its pressure on the Iraqi army in spite of heavy losses. Observers tend to agree that this time Iran did manage to capture three out of the five Iraqi defensive lines protecting Basra (Iraq's second largest city), bringing them to a position some 12 kilometres east of the city.

War of the cities

The Iraqi response to the Iranian advances is the tremendous increase in the "war of the cities". As an indication of their frustration on land, the Iraqis flew 129 sorties against Iranian cities and towns from 8 January. The Iranians responded to the air attacks by sparingly launching surface-to-surface missiles on the Iraqi capital, while asking their own population to build shelters.

This internicine butchery did not seem to end when, at the beginning of February, Taha Yassin Ramadhan, Iraq's Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister, threatened to impose "a great burden on Iran, in that it will lose 10 times as many casualties as it is losing now". He hinted that this would fuel the war of the cities even further. Observers believed that if the threat is not a mere bluff, then Baghdad intends to make use of Soviet-made "Scaleboards" (SS12) long-range missiles which have a range of 500 miles and are capable of destroying a large village in one go. It is not known though whether Iraq actually possesses these missiles.

Heavy Iranian losses

In spite of the heavy casualties, the war feeling is still high in Iran. After the Mohammad Corps of Volunteers was practically annihilated in the Kerbala 5 operation, the authorities announced the raising of a new 250,000 man-strong, Mahdi Corps to join the 650,000 troops already deployed in the southern sector. An increasing number of youths are now reported to have succeeded in fleeing to the west via Turkey and Pakistan to avoid being called up. But there is still no shortage of volunteers as yet.

Iran's determination to secure more Iraqi land is becoming suspicious in Iraq. Perhaps under the influence of the official anti-Persian propaganda machine, the man-in-the-street has begun to fear that after the discomfiture of Saddam Hussein's régime, the Iranians would not stop short of imposing a pro-Iran government in Baghdad under the aegis of the

Dawa Party which owes unquestioning allegiance to Khomeini. Such fears have not been allayed by very unskilful Iranian propaganda, and rather clumsy political manoeuvring.

The Iranians seem now to be aware of this fact and have repeatedly attempted to dispel such fears. Addressing the "Conference of Solidarity with the Iraqi People" in Tehran on 24 December 1986, President Ali Khamenei tried to reassure Iraqis when he stated, "We will never dictate the future of Iraq to the Iraqi people; and there is also no doubt that we cannot remain indifferent about any threat against Iraq by any person or government."

Iranian war aims

The downfall of Baathism is not an immediate condition for the Iranian leaders, who want to keep their options open. Asked, in a press conference on 28 January 1987, whether he would be contented with the departure of Mr Hussein only, in order to stop the war, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani answered, "We focused on Saddam Hussein from the outset, but in a war which has reached such a magnitude...it is not logical to punish just one person...I nevertheless think that if Saddam Hussein is removed, then the way will be cleared for the settlement of the problem."

Highly reliable sources reported privately

that the Iranian leaders' main aim now is to occupy Basra so as to achieve a psychological victory over the Baathists, and then they will offer to negotiate. Such an occupation would not necessarily bring down Mr Hussein's régime. Once in Basra, the Iranians would set up an Islamic republic under the Dawa Party's leadership - assuming there is no external intervention. If this scenario worked, then the Baathists would either resist further or find an alternative to Saddam Hussein for the Iranians to negotiate with. Any régime which would then govern Iraq would have to have an Islamic orientation, within which the Dawa Party would represent the around 60 per cent of Shia Iraqis. This is probably what President Khamenei meant when, addressing the Iraqi solidarity conference, he said that the political future of Iraq "should be settled in a way which would guarantee its (Iraq's) territorial integrity."

In the meantime the carnage will go on. The "Islamic Republic" argues that so far the Arabs have refused to name Iraq as the aggressor and that failing this and the departure of Saddam Hussein it will not accept any peace initiative. Tehran has gone too far in the conflict and needs this moral victory to justify its heavy toll to its public opinion. Moreover if the aggressor is not named it will not be easy to determine the war responsibilities and hence the payment of damages.

/9317

CSO: 4600/189

'OPERATION CLEANUP' CRITICIZED AS FOSTERING DIVISIVENESS

Karachi JANG in Urdu 2 Feb 87 pp 6, 7

[Article by Tehsin Afaqi: "Basic Reasons for Karachi Riots"]

[Text] I am unable to find the words to describe in detail the calamity and the dreadful period of tyranny and barbarity through which the residents of Karachi, especially Aligardh of Aurangi town, Qasba colony and the adjoining areas, passed at the beginning of the third week of December. Newspaper columns continue to provide background reviews and analysis regarding this sad incident.

The official statements have tried to create the impression that the drugs and arms smugglers were responsible for this human tragedy, stating that in reaction to "Operation Cleanup" in Sohrah Goth, the smugglers made unarmed and unrelated persons the target of cruelty and barbarity. All of the reviewers and analysts appear to be in agreement with these official statements. The administration has also tried to give the impression that a foreign conspiracy was operating behind these riots. Also, that anti-Pakistan elements, in order to achieve their contemptible goals, instigated disturbances and shed streams of blood in Karachi.

Some observers and analysts, in discussing the riots, have mentioned economic disparity, class struggle, the trampling of rights and sense of deprivation as being among the causes. Others have held the prolonged martial law in the country responsible. Some gentlemen have blamed the elections to the National Assembly on a nonparty basis for the turmoil. In the view of some observers, the elevation of regional nationalities, too, should be included in the list of causes. Most of them also think that large-scale corruption in the law-enforcement institutions and among government officials cannot be excluded from among the causes.

The first question that comes to mind is why, as a reaction to "Operation Cleanup", the drug and arms smugglers would make the refugees the target? The official statement said that the aim of this attack was to divert the administration's attention from "Operation Cleanup." This statement is totally absurd and unrealistic. The newspapers reported that the people of Sohrah Goth had already learned about the operation a day ahead. During the night of 11-12 December, 20 truck loads of goods was transferred to a

safe location. So as to the extent of the plan, no significant amount of arms or drugs was recovered. Thus, the people of Sohrab Goth did not suffer any remarkable loss. So to consider this as a rationale for those engaging in this bloodshed is incomprehensible. Even if the smugglers really had faced a major loss in Sohrab Goth, why, as a reaction to it, would there be a massacre of the refugees?

The refugees of Aurangi and Karachi were not responsible for "Operation Cleanup." This operation was planned by the administration. Therefore, the reaction also should have been against the regime. It might have been considered a reaction if government properties and offices had been attacked, police and police stations had been made the target, ministers had been the victims and government officials had been made to suffer. But this did not happen. Rather, those whose blood was shed were innocent, unarmed refugees who were not in any way connected with Operation Cleanup. I am convinced --and the circumstances and the evidence support this--that the responsibility for Karachi's tragic incident lies with the regime's administrative body and the police. In fact, in view of the evidence, I will not hesitate to say that the planning for this mass murder of refugees was carried out by the administration and the police. I will explain the reasons for this later on. The tyrannical attitude displayed by the administration and the police regarding this tragedy can only be compared with the oppression inflicted upon the Palestinians of the occupied Arab territories by the Israeli rulers.

"Operation Cleanup" commenced on the morning of 12 December. By noon of 13 December, the situation had begun to change in Aurangi. The stoning of motor vehicles at Banaras Chowk (intersection) began at about 4-5 pm, and by 6-7 pm all vehicular traffic heading for Aurangi through Banaras Chowk had been halted. The police, however, maintained a mysterious silence and did not take any action to restore traffic. Early on the next day, Sunday, 14 December, the situation began to deteriorate, and it became clear that something was going to happen in Aurangi. Finally, at 10 am. armed individuals attacked the areas of Aligarh colony and Qasba colony adjacent to Banaras Chowk. Such a wave of murder, bloodshed and arson occurred that one shudders even to think about it. This reign of blood and fire continued freely until 3 pm that day. The surprising fact is that there is a police post at Banaras Chowk, and the Aurangi police station is about 100 meters away from Aligarh colony. But perhaps the eyes of the police were closed so that they could not see either the assailants or the smoke rising from the burning houses. Probably, the police had no ears either, so that they could not hear the sound of the bullets, nor could the shrieks and cries of women, children and men reach their ears. The policemen at both the police post and the police station, safe inside, were busy gossiping. No one in the administration or at the police headquarters cared about the oppressed. Those who attacked Aligarh colony and Qasba colony, according to eyewitnesses, were familiar faces from the adjoining areas. No one was a stranger. This can be verified from the record of photographs taken during the attack that has been presented to the mayor of Karachi, Abdus Sattar Afghani. On 15 and 16 December, the police, in order to hide the mask of shame on their faces and to prove their efficiency, arrested many individuals

from various areas. Those arrested were not involved in the killings and destruction. Rather, out of fear, they themselves were hiding here and there. The police, however, reported in the record that these people were arrested while participating in the riots on Sunday, 14 December, from the areas of Banaras Chowk, Aligarh colony and Qasba colony. Furthermore, it generally happens that during an ordinary disruption, while bringing the crowd under control, one or two policemen will be injured, even though slightly: just a few days ago, the press reported that some policemen were injured while arresting two individuals involved in drug trafficking in the Liyari area. In this case, however, during such a big disturbance as that at Aurangi town, in which hundreds of individuals were killed, countless numbers were injured, numerous houses and stores were burned and financial loss of tens of millions of rupees were incurred, in the effort to stop that riot and arrest the attackers, not a single policeman suffered even a scratch!!!

Actually, the entire plan for this disturbance was made with the collaboration of the police and the administration. Whether "Operation Cleanup" achieved its desired objective or not is a matter for separate discussion. Nevertheless, this operation apparently destroyed the Sohrab Goth station. The interests of the administration and the police suffered a severe blow as a result of this operation, since this den served as the greatest source of secret income for the regime and the police. Thus, because of being deprived of acquiring large sums, it is only natural for the administration and the police to feel distressed, aggrieved and angry. To express their reaction, therefore, they devised a plan whereby both their "reaction" could be visible and their political aim could be achieved. For this purpose, the sole target could be made the refugees, the suppression of whose growing force had become essential for the administration. Since, due to past incidents, bitterness existed between the refugees and the Pathans, and those responsible for the Sohrab Goth station were also Pathans, therefore, cleverly and under the cover of "reaction," a plan was devised to create a disturbance between the refugees and the Pathans. Aurangi town is the area where the majority of Pathans residing in Karachi live along with the refugees. In the past, Aurangi town had been the center of violent incidents. That is why the riot was incited in that very region, and according to the plan, the administration launched an extensive propaganda campaign. In order to give the riots the form of contention between two language groups, the governor and chief ministers of Frontier Province and Baluchistan were summoned to Karachi, so that their influence could be utilized to control the passions of the Pathans. If the chief administrators of Frontier Province and Baluchistan were summoned to Karachi so that, in view of this major national calamity and for the sake of territorial unanimity and solidarity, they could appeal to the people to maintain unity and harmony and ask them to create an environment of love and brotherhood, why, then, were the governor and the chief minister of Punjab Province not invited? Without any doubt, therefore, it could be said that the regime and the police, under a set plan, gave this disturbance the form of a dispute between two language groups. Now, to satisfy the loyal and patriotic people of Karachi and Pakistan, they are trying their best to search for scapegoats. This effort of theirs will in the end be unsuccessful.

If an ordinary flood occurs in Bangladesh, some 200 to 250 people are killed and an ordinary financial loss of 1 million-1.5 million rupees is incurred, an aid campaign is immediately launched, the presidential fund is made available, 40 solid houses are constructed in Eurircher, and aircraft loaded with medicines, tents, clothing and food items are dispatched there. Furthermore, to demonstrate sympathy for the affected people, the president tours the stricken area (Bangladesh). This sentiment of human sympathy is commendable. In this case, however, a lot more people were killed in the president's own country: numerous persons were wounded; hundreds of houses were burned down; a financial loss of tens of millions of rupees was incurred. But the presidential fund is a far-off matter; not even medicines were dispatched instantly to the hospitals; no arrangements were made for the funeral rites of those killed. The administration did not even think about providing tents and food items to those affected. If the Aidhi Trust did not exist, if the people of Karachi, as a gesture of human friendship, had not immediately raced to fill up bottles with their blood, and if various welfare agencies had not promptly reached the stricken people with aid, God knows what would have been the condition of those who were wounded and those who remained alive.

The administration and the police, by conducting the mass murder of Urdu-speaking refugees in Karachi under the name of "Operation Cleanup," have made a contemptible effort to attain their political objective. The rights of the people have always been trampled by the ruling sector in Pakistan. Those who express a difference of opinion have been declared traitors. Those who have sacrificed everything in the struggle for and construction of Pakistan have been honored with the title of being anti-Pakistan. Now that the Urdu-speaking refugees are demanding the restoration of their rights, asking for justice and trying to have their loyalties and struggle for the construction of Pakistan recognized, they are being massacred, with the complicity of the administration and the police. Their leaders are being thrown in jail. They are being accused of disruption and labelled as being anti-Pakistan. In Bangladesh, 250,000 Pakistani patriots have been compelled to commit moral, cultural and linguistic suicide.

The federal and provincial governments are spreading the propaganda that foreign elements were involved in the Karachi riots, that they were the result of a conspiracy of the country's adversaries and that they were the work of those opposed to the solidarity of Pakistan. If this is true, then in practice the administration and the police themselves are the foreign elements, the enemies of the country and the opposers of Pakistan's integrity. It is the duty of the police to safeguard the lives and property of the people, but the police alone are the major cause of attacks on lives and property. It is the responsibility of the police to remove criminals from society and punish them for their evil deeds, but in practice the police alone promote crime, and the criminals receive full support from them. Until the administration and the police are fully cleansed, the danger of foreign elements, anti-Pakistan conspiracy and adversaries of territorial integrity will exist.

The past rulers of Pakistan, for the sake of their power and for the interests of a special group, constantly provoked confrontation between the Bengali- and Urdu-speaking people in East Pakistan, and at the same time, they shouted slogans of Islam. As a result, they had to relinquish the major portion of the country. Today, the very same politics of East Pakistan is being followed in Sind. Urdu- and Pushto-speaking people are being instigated to fight each other, and the slogan of Islam is being shouted simultaneously. God forbid that we might face the same result that we witnessed in East Pakistan. I doubt the sincerity of the ruling sector of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, this very group incited those who were loyal to Pakistan to fight each other. The Bengali Muslims laid the foundation of the Muslim League, and they played a comprehensive role in the movement for the establishment of Pakistan. If the Bengali Muslims had not laid the foundation of the Muslim League and had not given their entire vote for it, the establishment of Pakistan might have been impossible. If the Muslims of the minority provinces of united India had not supported the movement for Pakistan and had not offered the sacrifice of their lives and property for the foundation of Pakistan, then Pakistan might not have appeared on the world map. The Pakistani rulers, who belonged to a minority group, declared the majority traitors, and caused both loyalists of Pakistan to fight each other, so that their own power would not be challenged. But dishonesty, corruption and injustice cannot prosper forever. The result was that Pakistan was separated. Now, in Sind also, two loyal parties of Pakistan are being incited to fight each other. These refugees are the ones who gave unconditional support to the movement for Pakistan. They offered the sacrifice of their lives and property for the establishment of Pakistan. Also, for the construction of Pakistan, they deserted their birthplace and after passing through an ocean of fire and blood, migrated to Pakistan. Among the current four provinces of Pakistan, only Frontier Province has the honor of saying that its proud and bold people, enthusiastically and wholeheartedly, in the name of Islam, through a referendum proclaimed a unanimous decision in favor of their inclusion in Pakistan. If our Pathan brothers of Frontier Province had had no love for Islam, had had no belief in the ideology of Pakistan and had had no desire to spend their lives under an Islamic government, no one could possibly have forced them to join with Pakistan. Since the establishment of Pakistan, despite the poverty and backwardness, the manner in which they have served Pakistan and offered sacrifices for its defense, are worthy of being written in words of gold. They have been victims of injustice, exploitation and the dishonesty of the rulers of Pakistan, but their trust and confidence in Pakistan has not been shaken. Today, it is due to the politics of the rulers of Pakistan that both loyalists of Pakistan are at war with each other. Sometimes they are instigated to fight under the pretense of Bushra Zaidi's murder and to open fire on a procession of refugees. At other times, they are involved in fighting against each other under the cover of a fake reaction to so-called "Operation Cleanup" against drugs and illegal arms. Can Pakistan's solidarity be maintained through such policy and politics?

Pakistan is a country of various nationalities, and every nationality possesses a specific identity. The only identity of the refugees, however, is the ideology of Pakistan. The refugees and the ideology of Pakistan are inseparable. If the refugees are victims of oppression and barbarity, the

ideology of Pakistan cannot remain safe. In East Pakistan, due to cruelty and violence perpetrated on the refugees, the ideology of Pakistan suffered a blow, and Bangladesh came into existence. If here also, tyranny and barbarity continue to be practiced against the refugees, then definitely the ideology of Pakistan will prove to be outmoded and absurd. After that, what power exists that could maintain all four provinces under a single center?

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PEOPLE'S ARMY TO DEAL WITH ETHNIC, RACIAL PROBLEMS SUGGESTED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 1 Feb 87 p 3

[Article by Brig (Retd) Abdul Rahman Siddiqi]

[Text] The conditions, in view of which Air Marshal Asghar Khan felt the need for a People's Army and accordingly instructed Colonel Mehdi to form it, were so frightful and grave that such a thought was not only valid but indeed inescapable. On one hand, people lost their faith in the working and neutrality of the administration and the law and order agencies and on the other hand, there was a feeling of an acute need for self-help. The open bloodletting that went on in Aurangi on 14 December from morning till dusk is such an accusation against the government to which there is no defense. The surprising thing is that except for certain formal sophistries and explanations, no valid defense or excuse has yet been forthcoming from the government. The victims have been led to believe that if the government is so unconcerned about their safety, then they themselves will have to do something about it.

In fact, the Air Marshal's suggestion is an indication of this very thought and mentality.

It is worth considering what will be the repercussions and consequences of the formation of such a peoples army under our peculiar conditions. Institutions like peoples army are found in one-party systems as in the well-known communist countries. In a multiparty system, this kind of organization is imaginable in two situations. Firstly, that its formation and administration should be in the hands of the government and secondly, that every party should be allowed to have its own peoples army. Clearly, the peoples army that Asghar Khan has suggested, has connections only to him and his party. This army will operate under the flag of the Tehrike Istiqlal and it will have nothing to do with any other party and no one else will have any control over it. The necessary consequence of this will be that every party will like to have its own army and it is quite conceivable that there will be as many armies in the country as there are parties.

This is not a nightmare or a morbid imagination but rather the necessary result of the concept of peoples armies on the basis of parties. Only in a one-party system can we escape from this kind of scenario. In such a system, government belongs to only one party. The party leader is more powerful than both the

president or the prime minister. This is the condition in China and the Soviet Union. The one party system is poles apart from the parliamentary or the presidential systems and it is very close to the collective or party dictatorships. The most important pillar of a one party system is its closeness to the party ideology and this ideology is not only the ideology of the party but of the entire country. Complete government system of the country and the civic and national affairs are subordinate to this ideology. In USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe and wherever else the one party system operates, the party and the nation occupy the same status and every institution, including the government, is subservient to it. Only under these severe and totalitarian conditions is it possible to envisage a peoples army. Under all other conditions, every party will have to be given the right to form its own militia and the status of every party leader will be no less than that of a warlord.

These days India too is facing the same problem. There is an abundance of private armies there and most of the parties are at odds with one another. Leave alone the Sikhs, for whom wearing a sword is a religious tradition and who for years have been counted among the martial races. Sikhs and the Nihangs are on the warpath with the government. During the Blue Star operation of 1984, the entire world witnessed their warlike character and their full preparedness. On the strength of their overwhelming fire power, the Indian troops did eventually succeed in entering the Darbar Sahib but the kind of opposition they encountered from the forces of Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwala, was beyond the wildest dreams of the Indian army. Jarnail Singh's forces had been trained by the well-known major general of the Indian army, Shah Bhegh Singh. Shah Bhegh Singh was an expert in guerrilla warfare and in 1971 he formed Mukti Behini groups out of the deserters of the East Bengal regiment.

Apart from the Sikhs, there are several big and small armies of the fundamentalist Hindus. Well-known among them are, Shiv Shena, Yashunkti Sena and Bajrang Dal etc. The aim of these warlike groups is not only to restore to the ancient Hindu religion but also to turn India into a pure Aryavarat, that is, a country of Hindus. Fundamentalist Hindus regard Islam and the Muslims as their greatest enemies and they are trying to get rid of them somehow or the other. Their final aim is the same as that of movements like Swami Dayanand Saraswati's Arya Smaj and Swami Shardha Nand's Shudhi and Sangathan. These movements flourished during the first quarter of this century. Their aim also was to convert India into Bharatvarsh or the capital of Hindua. Because of the abundance of these warlike organizations, there has emerged a new culture in India. This is called Trishul culture. The trishul of trident is an instrument in the shape of a three-pronged dagger or sword. This is the symbol, as well as the weapon of the Trishul people.

In reply to the anti-Islamic activities of Hindu fundamentalists, there was a strong reaction among Muslim youth and they too, began to arm themselves on warlike basis. Muslim resentment took a quantum leap when an attempt was made to convert the ancient Barbari Masjid of Ayudhia (Faizabad) into a mandir merely on the supposition that it was the birth place of Ramchandra. At the same time, a defamation campaign was started against Muslim prophets and holy men. The Muslims showed forbearance to some extent but later they too came out in anger and announced the formation of their own army.

This army is known as Adam Sena and its life and soul is Sayyad Ahmed Bukhari, the deputy Chief Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid. He is also the son of Sayyad Abudllah Bukhari, the Chief Imam of Delhi's Jama Masjid. It is said that the Muslim youth in their thousands are flocking to the Adam Sena and they have warned the Hindus who want to convert Babari Masjid into Rams' birth place that unless they refrain from their unhold aims and actions, Adam Sena will march to Ayudhia and take matters into its own hands.

After this necessary and relevant discussion, let us once again examine the question of Tehrike Istiqlal's people army. We do not know what will be its class and ethnic composition and what will be the number of Pathans, Punjabis, Baluchis, Sindhis and Mohajirs. Nor do we know what will be its relation to the society. One cannot envisage a people's army without balancing and keeping a proportion between class and race. Differences and variety are natural. It is quite likely that whoever enlists in the army, with the exception of a few patriots and those full of spirit of service, will mostly be either unemployed or crazy fighters, who are out for an opportunity to kill or get killed. To keep such elements under control and to keep them in a para-military organization or a similar, but inferior body, will not be an easy task.

We do not know if this army will be armed or unarmed. In the event of its being armed, what will be the nature of its weaponry. Will it be a baton, a club, or a pistol and a rifle. Will these be procured under license from the government or will unlicensed arms do? If this army is unarmed, what will be its role? Will it be the Pakistani version of the Salvation Army or the Mukti Army? In this case, more than arms, it will need a pretty uniform and a band.

Beofre Col Mehdi starts drawing up a blue print for the people's army according to the instructions of the air marshal, he will have to ponder over his army's rules and its role and decide whether it will proceed by exerting moral pressure or whether it will act on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

Now let us briefly examine the racial composition of this army and the problems arising from it. There is little doubt that racial and linguistic tension is a very intractable and real fact of life for Pakistan in general and for Karachi in particular. It has been poisoning the atmosphere in Pakistan and Karachi by assuming shapes such as Sindhi versus non-Sindhis, sometimes the Muhajir Punjabi Pathan Front [against the Sindhis], sometimes the Sindhi Pathan Baluch Front [against the Punjabis] and at other times Muhajir versus Pathan. To this potpourri has now been added the Afghan Muhajirin and Mujahidin. But for the time being, we will ignore them in the hope that these unhappy people are not a part of our life and they will one day return to their own land.

Following the deaths in the Bashi Zedi traffic accident of April 1985, the racial character of riots in Karachi has been confined to the Muhajirs and the Pathans. Whatever happened in Aurangi and Aligarh colonies was mostly between the Muhajirs and the Pathans. I personally favor the theory that the fighting actually was not between the common Muhajirs and the Pathans but that the entire rioting was engineered by the mafia that operates arms and drug smuggling. It is they who

took revenge of Sohrab Goth on the Biharis of Aurangi whereas the common Pathan has nothing to do with it. Still the fact remains that the Pathans and Muhajirs were pitted against each other.

Under these conditions, imagine that if a gang of 10,000 frontier tribal men attacks Muhajir residential areas, what will be the composition and what will be the role of the people's army. Before this army is ordered to come into action, what will be the reaction of its various constituents especially the Muhajirs and the Pathans? What will happen to their mutual confidence and cooperation? To which side will the Punjabi, the Baluchi and the Sindhi elements of the force be inclined? Who will command this force and will it have sufficient fire power to deal effectively with the enemy. Moreover, what will be the role of the regular army in this crisis? Will it remain a silent spectator or will it be forced to intervene?

If the people's army is exclusively attached to one party, what will be its locus standi? Like the party, will it be required to register? Under which law will the discipline be enforced? For example, if in the event of a crisis, its Pathan or Mohajir elements refuse to obey orders, either singly or in a group, under what law, criminal code or morality will action be taken against them?

In the past, we have known the fate of para-military organizations like the Khaksars and Muslim League guards. The latter was after all a ceremonial body which was meant mostly to present formal guard of honor during important meetings of the Muslim League. But Ullema Mashraqi's Khaksar was a regular para-military force. Those who joined it used to sign the forms in their blood. The spade was their weapon. But it disappeared only a few years after independence. More or less the same fate was reserved for Uillema Attaullah Shah Bakhari's Ahar Party.

It is said that at this time there are 60-70 big and small parties in the country. Even if one-third of them raise their own armies, it means that there will be at least 2 dozen private armies which will not have any discipline nor will there be any machinery to enforce this discipline. Instead of being a guardian of peace, such a force will become a danger to it.

Air Marshal Asghar Khan's concept of CSF may be correct and appropriate in its own place, but in order to implement it, he will have to (and he should) wait till such time as his party comes to power. After that he will have the right to change the current concept of national defense and Pakistan's military and mould it according to his party's manifesto and to coordinate the formation of people's army with the new form of armed forces. But if under present conditions, he intends to form and raise a people's army on the basis of his party, then how can the other parties be stopped from following suit? In that case, it may well be that the entire country will become a battleground not only for opposing parties but also for opposing armies.

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